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Preface
&
The purpose of this study was to design a multi-
level secure local netuork for the U.S. Air Force's
Electronic Security Command at Kelly Air Force Base,
Texas. The resulting design was modeled with all
traffic encrypted for secure point-to-point communica-
tions implementing a packet-switching store-and-f orward
scheme over a dual loop ring topology using frequency
division multiplexed fiber optics. To analytically
validate the design, Jackson's Theorem was applied to
a simplified version of the model. The results were
encouraging. To further evaluate the model, a simulation
of the streamlined model was attempted on a microcomputer
with 64K RAM. The language used for the simulation
was PASCAL. Even though it appears to be feasible to
validate a network model on a microcomputer, it was





/'.-i' , > '.s. s

fc















Table of Contents v
List of Figures viii
List of Tables lx
List of Terms x
Abstract xv













Model's Security Assumptions and
Safeguards 18
Physical Security 18








<-<.*#*'.' £5% s ,-•'
: . -r' \;.,^.
/

\ .». v^r\ >^.^.^ :/t <.'/•;/",;r:i8;»t,' v' <T.'1 •".'•' •"• •" • "* '"'' '-^ '• ',j '-v.« "r-TE "* *> *? 7WT?I *. ' f ly.' " j » .'» J ' in- »" > l w. »j" "r-
vi
Page Number






















Dummy Message Control 66
Summary of the Model 67
Chapter IV: The Model's Evaluation .... 76
Overviev; 76
Analysis with Jackson's Theorem. ... 76
Simplification of the Model ... 76
Applying Jackson's Theorem. ... 78
Results 84
























, »vav> "A"j|."'-\"j i.v 'j'
v
*> %p w$?sTF%yTs *>•v f * »'u • ^ '.^j^ s^t^t*?* ?*yrf* "* v* 1 i* 1 j.t" Ty^syw '. i *." m. "< ' ^ ' i,""*"^
v>
Page Number
Chapter V: Conclusions and
Recommendations 1C3
Overview 103
Areas for Further Study 103
Conclusions 105
Bibliography 107
Appendix A: Program Lining A-l
Appendix B: Structure Chart B-l





10£^ -ymf^ % : -' - ' * .>- - ;^-m

















The Seven Layer ISO
Reference Model 43
Model's Frequency Division
for an 18 MDPS Fiber Optic
Medium 53
The Dual Loop Network for
this Model 67
Allowable Traffic for
Security Classification 1 . 68
Allowable Traffic for
Security Classification 2 . 68






Functions Performed by the
Simulation Program 90
viii
:\"V '." -••'- ** ^'K-' ~

















Table I I 1-2 Comparison of Network
Control Scheme Applicable
to this Model-"
Part I. . .
Part II . .
Table III-3. Comparison of Switching
Techniques
Table IV-1. Mean Arrival Rates for the
Simulation using Jackson's
Theorem
Table IV-2. Performance Parameters
Computed using Jackson's
Theorem
Table IV-3. Variables Used in the
































' lM ' p^tt*?* v ' >" »* ' - i
.v..
List of Terras
access control: 1) network - strategy used to
capture the network's transmission medium;
2) security - the process and procedures used
to restrict entry Into the system only to
those who are authorized; these procedures
Implement the relevant discretionary and non-
discretionary security policies
application node: for this thesis, a node, designated
by an "A", which will respond to a job request
from another node
available: a system that is operational and can
provide service; an available system is
characterized by long mean-t iine-between-f allures
and short time-to-repair, it is usually fault
tolerant
(& backbone: the interconnection of interface message
processors (IMPs); refer to topology
broadcast: a communication architecture with the
following characteristics: 1) a single
comraunica t icn channel is shared by all IMPs;
2) all messages transmitted over the channel
are received by all IMPs; 3) every message
contains information to tell the IMPs if the
message is for it, if it isn't it is ignored
block: 1) refer to packet; 2) "blocking" occurs
when a message arrives from outside the system
but cannot enter a node due to lack of buffer
space
bulk data traffic: traffic composed of messages of
more than 100,000 bits or, traffic which is not
bursty
%
bursty traffic: traffic composed of messages of
short duration; for this thesis, bursty
messages will not exceed 16334 bits in length
(excluding transmission overhead)
N. Jtf/jfcY- 1 •a
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• j communication node: for this thesis, a node,
designated by a "C", which can only generate
job requests; the "C' nodes are gateways
from/to other networks
CRC code: cyclic redundancy code, a polynomial
checksum scheme which is used for the detection
of transmission errors; for more Information
refer to Tannenbaum's Computer Networks
data base transfer traffic: for this thesis,




1) discretionary security access procedures
implement "need-to-know" protection that are
established and may be chan 6 ed by the
organization which has cognizant authority over
the resource to be accessed;
2) non-discretionary security access procedures
implement mandatory access controls that
require all users to be cleared to a security
level and compartment equal to or exceeding the
classification of the resource being accessed
error: a conditon that arises because of incorrect
bits in a message as detected by a cyclic
redundancy checksum (CRC)
encryption: a method useful for protection of data
that must be transmitted over media that
cannot be protected against unauthorized
monitoring; two types of encryption: a) link:
implies encryption and decryption by each
network processor, is used for data flowing
over a specific physical path (link); b) end-
to-end: the message is enciphered once at the
source and deciphered only at the final
destination (LAN 83: 87)
fault: a condition that arises when a link is





fault tolerant: a fault in one component does not
bring the system to a halt; through redundancy in
critical components and/or through the isolation
of a fault to limiting the loss of service to a
small fraction of the whole, a fault tolerant
system displays "graceful degradation"
flexibility: that characteristic which permits
growth and extension in functional
capabilities, in number of nodes, and in
geographic coverage
host: the computer system connected to an IMP or node
IMP: interface message processor; the basic
communication component in a node, a
communication support computer
interoperability: that characteristic which is the
ability to communicate across different networks
intruder: an unauthorized agent or entity
multi-level secure network: for this thesis, a
network which supports concurrent/simultaneous
transmission of different security
levels/categories; a multi-level secure network
does not imply that the operating systems of
hosts attached to its nodes are multi-level
secure, each node's hosts may be operated at
dedicated, system high, compar tmen t ed , and/or
multiple secure levels
multiplexing: the process of achieving simultaneous
transmissions of distinct signals over one
channel of communication; there are two basic
techniques: (1) frequency division and 2) time
division (THO 71: 11-14)
node: an IMP and the equ ipment /machines connected
to it; for this thesis, only one host is




packet: a data transfer unit which is exchanged
between nodes, one or more units make up a
complete message; for this thesis, each packet
will have a fixed length of 102,400 (100K) bits -
,
this length includes holding up to 100,000 bits
of data plus 2,400 bits of header and trailer
information
point-to-point: also known as "s tore-and-f orwar d"
,
this is a communication technique whereby a
message or packet is sent from one IMP to its
destination IMP; when the source and
destination IMPs are not directly adjacent or
connected to one another, the transmission is
via one or more intermediate IMPs, at each
Intermediate IMP the message is received in its
entirety and temporarily stored there until it
can be transmitted "forward" towerds its final
destination
©
protocol: the rules and conventions used to control
network functions; logical abstractions of the
physical process of communication; protocols
perform three tasks: a) establish standard data
elements, b) establish conventions, c) establish
standard communications paths (MCQ 78: 1); refer
to Figure 11-2 for the seven layer ISO reference
model
reliability: a) that characteristic which refers to
the freedom from loss of service due to random
failures in the equipment or facilities
(STO 80: 1472-1473), often referred to as
"availability"; b) freedom from random
transmission errors
security reference monitor: a set of trusted
hardware and software that establishes and
enforces network security access controls to
include all discretionary and non-discretionary
policies and provide complete mediation








survivability: that characteristic which is the
ability to survive enemy actions; to Stoveri
the three aspects of tnonitorabil ity , self-
diagnosis, and maintainability are related to
survivability (STO 80: 124J-12A2)
switching methods: techniques used to affect how
different users share the transmission medium
(refer to Table 11-3)
TCP/IP: Transmission Control Protocol /Internetwork
V Protocol; developed on the ARPANET, the
•\ protocol set adopted by the USAF as standard
\ for all networks; refer to DOD 82, USAF 82,
'-: and USAF 83 sources for more information
topology: the physical layout of a network; there
\ are two levels: 1) backbone - the inter-
im connection of IMPs; 2) local access - the
.• interconnection of hosts, terminals, and
peripherals to a specific IMP
»* trusted: a component comprised of hardware and/or
software that can be relied on to enforce the
S relevant security policy; a " 'trusted
*-, computing base' is ... the totality of
protecting mechanisms within a ... system
£• ... the combination of which are responsible
Q for enforcing a security policy." (LAN 83: 88);
a trusted component is correct (i.e., it
operates according to its specifications) and
incorruptible (i.e., it cannot be modified by










This research sponsored by the USAF's HQ ESC/AD
a
develops a multilevel secure host-to-host computer
local area network. The design process is presented.
The resulting network uses a ring topology with
packetized point-to-point switching over fiber optics
communication links. For transmission security,
packets are source host-to-destination host encrypted
as well as encapsulated with link-to-link encryption.
Message transmission is controlled with message
acknowledgements and credits within a non-preemptive
three priority class queue. A simplified version of
the resulting network was validated by applying
Jackson's Theorem. Additionally, the simplified view
was modeled with a PASCAL simulation program executed
on a 6AK microcomputer. Unfortunately, the comparison
of the simulation against the analytical results that
were obtained using Jackson's Theorem was net possible
due to problems modeling the network on the micro-
computer. Follow-on work in the area of simulation is
needed to successfully complete the simulation and
compare results.
xv
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General Requirements . This thesis was sponsored by
the U.S. Air Force'o Electronic Security Command at
Kelly A.F.B., Texas (HQ ESC/AD Bldg 2000 San Antonio, TX
78243)
.
It develops a multi-level secure host-to-host
local computer network model. Mr. Hoelscher (Chief,
Executive System Software Branch and Technical Advisor,
Directorate of Systems Technology) served as the point
of contact at HQ ESC/AD. He provided the constraints
and requirements which influenced the network's design
(HOE 82; HOE 83)
.
There were two major ESC requirements that had to
be met for a successful design. The first one was that
the network had to efficiently process traffic that
would be primarily bulk in nature.
The second major requirement was the most important
and restrictive; the network had to be secure and
provide concurrent multi-level security. The security
aspects were pervasive because the network was required
to receive, transmit, and process classified and












could damage national security.
Additionally, the resulting model had to be -
verified. A simplified version of the model was
analytically evaluated by applying Jackson's Theorem.
Additionally, a limited simulation written in PASCAL was
attempted on the streamlined model. The simulation va.
executed on a 6AK microcomputer. Unfortunately, this
part of the verification was not completed to form a
part of the model's analysis.
These issues were refined during the development of
the thesis. But the dominant requirement throughout the
design process was security.
Multi-level security requirements and the
protocols and architecture required to support then
are areas that have received increased interest as
illustrated by the bibliography of this thesis. The
many favorable characteristics of computer networks have
been well documented by authors such as Booth, the
Dennings, Donaldson, Kent, Kline, Kuo, Popek, Stelte,
Tanenbaum, Tropper, and Weitrman. However, primarily
due to a fear of compromise, the military has not taken
full advantage of computer networks (STI 80: 1472).
:%^m%M /- >u. /£
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Recently, with the advent of applications such as
electronic fund transfers, security problems have been
receiving greater scrutiny by the business and academic
communities (KEN 76: 8; KON 81: 761; KUO 81: xi; TAN
81b: A80)
.
Many experts feel that even with safeguards
such as access controls, flow controls, data encryption,
and inference controls, "absolute" security is
impossible (DEN 79: 227-228, 246; POP 79: 355). But
what degree of security is attainable?
Organization . Prior to performing any analysis
which would lead to a model for a secure network, an
approach was required. A series of principles were
reviewed and those deemed appropriate were adopted.
These principles formed the foundation of the
methodology that was adopted to develop the network.
This methodology is covered in Chapter I.
The next chapter is a discussion of some of the
major constraints and requirements that apply to the
model, those of security. The final section of the
second chapter presents several safeguards and
assumptions on the model's security and its environment.
The third chapter discusses how and why this
V.v
s
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particular model was developed. It describes in detail
the design process. The decisions made concerning
topology, network control, and protocols are presented
her* with the ever present influence of security.
Whenever possible, while examining the model's various
features, comparisons arc made among the advantages and
disadvantages of other network designs.
In the fourth chapter, the analysis and verification
are discussed. The simplifying assumptions and the
results of applying Jackson's Theorem are analyzed.
*m The final chapter presents conclusions,
*7
recommendations, and further areas of study generated by
this thesis.
Me thodol ogy
Background . The methodology adopted for this study
rests on two distinct but related sets of principles.
The overriding set of principles are security related.
However, the network could not be developed strictly
with security in view if it was to perform any useful
applications with any reasonable degree of efficiency.
Therefore, the overall approach was to develop a network

with the additional principles of simplicity, and.
reliability. The goal was a network which was as simple
as possible (to ease implementation, review,
maintenance, and future growth) and as available (fault
tolerant, with long mean*-t ime-between-f allures , and with
short time-to-repair) as possible while not over
complicating the design aspects which would make it
Impossible to provide adequate security.
The principles followed to analyze, develop,
and maintain security were adapted from Dr. Stephen B.
Kent's "Protocols and Techniques for Data
Communication Networks". Kent delineates eight
specific principles of design.
Ke nt's Princip les. Kent's first principle is
probably the most important. The design should be
simple. A simple design simplifies the tasks of
implementation, verification, and maintenance.
The next two principles, that of fail-safe
defaults and of complete mediation, are constraints
that help attain a secure system. These principles
are directed not at exclusion (or "why not" permit
access) but at "why" should access by allowed. This











positive approach constrains the set of who nay
access the system and its resources in a manner
which permits greater restriction and hence less
chance of an intruder penetrating through oversight.
Thus, access will only be permitted if specifically,
Instead of tacitly, granted. The default will be to
deny access. In this manner, the person seeking access
must go through some human (security officer) control
prior to the system getting his "name" in the system's
access roster. Therefore, all users are required to
comply with non-discretionary (mandatory) security rules
which serve as an overall barrier to the intruder. But
discretionary control 6hould also be provided. This
control can be specified at the option of the user who
can further constrain what he does for a particular
application, session, and/or transaction (AME 83a: 15).
With users conscientiously applying discretionary
security rules, unnecessary security risks are avoided.
The fourth principle is not widely accepted by
the military. It is the principle of open design.
The argument against an open design is that "a
secret design may have the additional advantage of
/
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significantly raising the price of penetration,
especially the risk of detection". But Kent argues
that an open design is easier to review since there
Is no need to hide safeguards which should remain
secret in a closed design (KEN 81b: 372). However, in
light of the sensitivity of national security
requirements, a closed design should be followed.
Separation of privilege and of least privilege
are the fifth and sixth principles. These
principles help limit damage from penetration. They
enforce least access, ensure "need-to-know", and add
the safeguard of multiple keys for access to any
given level. Any security violation should have a
limited scope of potential compromise/damage. Not
only should there be separate access rosters for
different security classifications, but each
security classification should be compartmentalized
to deny complete access to that level in case of
penetration. This compar tmental izat ion is created
through separate rosters, passwords, and even
hardware safeguards which will act as bulwarks and will
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has been penetrated. This need to limit damage is
further emphasized in the seventh principle.
The seventh principle is that of least common
mechanism. By keeping to the very minimum
mechanisms which are in common throughout the
system, penetration can be more readily localized
and subversion of the entire system is less likely
to occur. This entails the use of separate rosters
and different passwords for each system resource, as
well as the use of other physical, software, hardware,
and human safeguards to secure components of the 6ystem
from a potential intrusion (the use of discretionary
controls helps accomplish this endeavor). Thus rosters
cannot be accessed by the same password and different
passwords and security profiles are required for
different resources located in separate physical
locations (like vaults) to which access is restricted to
different sets of users.
Because of these principles, different
authorizations or permissions are required to access
different components and compartments. By requiring an
audit trail that tracks location of user, password(s).
i .
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location of resource(s) required, and tine of
system/resource call and release, a system can be
implemented with multiple crosschecks which will reveal
where a penetration has occurred, what has been subject
to compromise, and the extent of the compromise.
Knowing what has been compromised Is a major goal in a
security conscious environment.
Finally, the last principle is that of
psychological acceptability. User friendliness is a
concept often overlooked. But a safeguard which can
not be easily and routinely used Is often ignored.
What is the use of passwords if the user has them
written on a piece of paper in his wallet because
they are so many and so long? This results in the
elimination of a barrier for a potential intruder.
Whenever and wherever possible, the safeguards and
countermeasures should be automatic and should use
only trusted system components.
The Approach . The approach taken to apply this
me tV ">dology was to first read about networks and
then analyze network designs in light of Kent's
principles. The works of Clark, Kuo, McQuillan,
.-. w I \
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Tanenbaum, Thurber and Trcpper were the most applicable
during the initial stages of this study. Acceptable
designs were earmarked for further comparison during
which additional constraints caused by the environment
vtte applied. Once the choices were narrowed to a few
general options, a comparison of their respective
advantages and disadvantages was made using tables
derived from the previously mentioned sources (as well
as from the works of Agrawala, Bux, Habara, Homayoun,
Ikeda, Penney, Popek, Kent, Stlllman, Stover, and Wolf)
which summarized these characteristics. Prom these
tables a choice of topology, network access controls,
and protocols was made bearing In mind the need for
simplicity and reliability.
The chosen options (discussed in Chapter 111) were
then combined into a design which could meet the desired
characteristics for the secure network. It was then
necessary to validate this design. To do so, Jackcon's
Theorem was applied to a simplified version of the model
as a check. Then an attempt was made to perform a
PASCAL simulation on a 6AK RAM microcomputer of the
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confidence in the results end, also, to investigate how
a network validation could be performed on a
microcomputer . This, unfortunately, was not completed
as part of this thesis. The choice of machine and the
choice of language caused problems which were not
resolved by the completion of this research. Thus,
verification of the model was by way of Jackson's
Theorem and only for a simplified version of it.
Before an analysis was feasible, a design was
required. But what must the network to be designed
safeguard against? An overview of security requirements












Security Requirements : An Overview
.
The Environment . The environment in which a
network Dust operate constrains the topological
options available for implementation. Additional
restrictions occur when the network must be a secure
local network (SLN).
According to Coviello and Lebow, "the essential
distinctions" between military and non-military
applications "can be summed up with the single
catch-phrase 'survivability'" (COV 80: HA1). The
military environment can range from peacetime to
nuclear warfare. But many systems need not
safeguard against all the conditions of the entire
range of possibilities nor may they be able to do so.
For example, this thesis's particular SLN is not
expected to withstand overt physical attack. But
survivability is possible only for a specific set of
threats (COV 80: 1441), so what are the set of threats
to be met by this thesis's SLN?
Safeguards. Threats, and SLN Characteristics . The











#should be able to survive are covered, among others, by
Kent, Popek, and Stillman. The cited work of these
authors does not cover the threat of war. Since the
SLN developed for this thesis is not expected to survive
in wartime, the safeguards and threats presented by them
apply to the model. Unfortunately, not one of them
gives a definite way of Implementing any of these
safeguards.
In pages 778-779 of his article "Security
Requirements and Protocols for a Broadcast Scenario",
Kent lists five major security requirements to counter
potential threats. The first requirement is the need to
prevent unauthorized release of message text. Then
there is the need to prevent (or disrupt) traffic
analysis by potential intruders. Wiretapping is one way
that intruders can attempt to get the information they
should be denied. Therefore, the need to safeguard
against both active and passive wiretapping is critical.
(Passive wiretapping is merely the listening of traffic
without attempting to modify the transmission stream.
Active wiretapping includes the insertion and/or











Kent also presents the need to verify message
authenticity, integrity, and ordering as the fourth
requirement. It is closely related to the need to
prevent message stream modification, message deletion,
and spurious or intentional message Insertion (the fifth
requirement )
.
Popek and Kline present many of the sane
requirements (POP 79: 332-334). They also mention
the need to safeguard against the tapping of lines
and the Introduction of spurious messages.
Additionally, they mention that safeguards are
needed to prevent retransmission of a previously
transmitted and acknowledged valid message and to
detect and/or prevent disruption (or blockage) by
malicious (intruder/interloper) act6 or system
failure (s)
.
The military's view of the threats is presented
by Stillman and Defiore (STI 80: 1472-1473) who are
technical advisors to the Air Force (USAF/SI). They
reiterate the need to prevent unauthorized access to
classified information, the need to assure











viretapping and analysis of traffic flow. Also they
expand upon the need to guard against unauthorized
access to physical facilities and communication
links and against subversion by unauthorized users
and authorized users not in their authorized "area".
Furthermore, they present the need to protect the
availability of resources for authorized use in
three operational environments: routine, high
traffic stress, and degraded operations which
includes protection of authorized users from each
other.
Stover presents safeguards and threats in a
different way by defining six characteristics that
any military SLN should have (STO 80: 1241-1242). These
characteristics are desireable and pertinent to this
SLN, too. They were used in helping reject options in
Chapter 111.
The first characteristic is that of survivability
which Stover defines as the ability of the digital
communications function to survive enemy actions. Stover
presents the three related aspects of survivability:




*Stover, nonltorablllty , self-diagnosis, and
maintainability aean that the network must be tolerant
of failures; that failures must be detected, isolated,
temporarily accommodated by operational procedures
(which should be automatic whenever possible); and that
failures must be repairable.
The second characteristic, reliability, refers
to the freedom from loss of service due to random
failures in the equipment or facilities, i.e. network
operation ideally should not depend on the continued
operation of any particular node or transmission
link. A reliable system is dependable.
The next two characteristics, accuracy and
stability, are related. Accuracy ar.d stability
refer to timing (message synchronization) and
timing contributes to error detection and
identification as well as to reliability. The key
concept here i6 that the sending and receiving nodes
agree when to send and expect messages and how these
messages are being relayed. For example, if a
message is expected and none is received in some







is safe to assume that some error has occurred. At
this time, some error handling protocol gains
control of the processing. As the percentage of
errors that occur and are not detected decreases,
the system reliability increases.
Flexibility is that characteristic which
permits growth and extension in functional
capabilities, in number of nodes, and/or geography.
By their nature, networks tend to have the
flexibility of incremental growth (BOO 81: 6-31; KUO
81: lx-xi; TAN 81a: 3-5).
The last characteristic is that of
interoperability. Interfaces with other digital
communication systems should be f ac i 1 i ta ted "by
having a timing which assures that the buffers will
not have to be reset more frequently than at some
acceptable rate.
Another aspect of interoperability is the
ability to communicate across different networks.
Connectively between networks is usually made over nodes
that are called gateways. (Gateways convert from one
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gateways are gateways that also do some additional
processing (like filtering traffic by security level,
encryption/decryption processing, or guard functions);
ESC's gateways are all value-added gateways.) An
additional means of achieving internetworking is to
force a common protocol set among all networks for
purposes of homogeneity.
In any case, not all of these safeguards, threats,
and characteristics are applicable to this model. The
next section shows the relationships of the above
concepts to the SLN model developed. It addresses the
assumptions made and the physical constraints which
define the network's many requirements.
Model's Security Assumptions and Safeguards .
Physical Security . Without physical security, no
other security safeguard is effective (WOO 81: 70). The
SLN designed in this thesis will have guaranteed
physical security. It will be located in a secure
building which has active and passive safeguards. All
the resources/hardware will be in rooms that will be












equipment, as veil as the transmission lines, will be
sheathed to shield against electromagnetic emanations
vhlch would permit eavesdropping. Access controls at
each node will Insure against the possibility of someone
at one node Illegally accessing resources at another
node.
A More Secure Transmission Medium . There are two
major choices for transmission medium for this
network, coaxial cable and fiber optics. A comparison
of the security characteristics of these two media
follows .
If the transmission medium chosen were fiber optics
Instead of coaxial cable, tapping would be more
difficult (WOO 81: 70). Also, because the media will be
physically sec-are, another critical security advantage
of fiber optics over coaxial cable is found in the realm
r>f electromagnetic radiation. Unlike coaxial cable,
electromagnetic impairments are nonexistent in
transmissions over fiber optics medium (CLA 81: 23; HOM
80: 980-981; KEN 83). Finally, encryption techniques
can be applied with fiber optics just as well as with












Because of the above mentioned characteristics,
fiber optics Is a more secure transmission medium and
worth any additional expense. Tabic II1-4 (on page 50)
summarizes the characteristics of both media.
Encryption: Advantages and Disadvantages .
Simmons (SIM 79: 314) and Popek (POP 79: 332-333, 335-
336, 338) consider encryption to be the only way to
send information over unsecure media and the best way
to improve security and message integrity. Wood
states that "cryptography is the only cost-effective
control" against many threats and Is essential for the
maintenance of message integrity (DAV 81: 155, WOO 81:
71).
Simmons also argues that encryption helps
provide secrecy and integrity. But Simmons warns that
It is not perfect and is best used in authentication
(SIM 79: 314, 322). Popek and Kline also recommend the
use of encryption for authentication (POP 79: 336); but
they categorically state that it does not provide
protection against inadvertent or intentional
modification of data (POP 79: 338). (The use of checksum








Therefore, encryption Is but one control, not'a
panacea, and Is useless without physical protection (WOO
81: 70). But it helps achieve secrecy/confidentiality
(i.e. protects data and the source and/or sink from
disclosure), it preserves data Integrity, and it allows
for the Introduction of enciphered signals to conceal
message length and frequency statistics which are
critical for traffic analysis (LAN 83: 87, WOO 81: 71).
Wood emphasizes end-to-end rather than less secure and
more expensive link-to-link encryption. But the use of
both methods simultaneously does add an additional
degree of security. Wood also believes that encryption
is vital because it can provide message, user, and
process authentication and validation assuring integrity
of transactions (WOO 81: 74).
Kent states that encryption (and all other
security requirements and tasks) can cause
unacceptable overhead that adversely impacts upon
network performance (KEN 81a: 785; also supported by RUS
83: 55-57); but it is the most effective countermeasure









adverse effects can in part be offset by high speed
communication links (KEN 81a: 785).
Encryption will be the primary means to maintain
security within the network. It is a good way to
protect against alteration of message contents and
message insertion; and it preserves data and
transaction integrity (LAN 83; NES 83; POP 79; SIM 79;
WOO 81).
Model's Encryption . Stillman's advice on
encryption is "rather than attempting to separate
multi-level users by monitoring and controlling data
accesses, end-to-end encryption attempts to disguise
the data at the source, maintain them in
unintelligible form all along the communications
path, and decrypt them only at the destination" (STI
80: 1473-1474). This advice is followed in the
model. All transmissions over the network are
encrypted twice. But, agreeing with Stillman (and
Rushby and Rar.dell) that security often rests on the
secrecy of the key rather than the algorithm, this
thesis will not have algorithm selection nor key





In this model, there are two levels of
encryption which combine link and end-to-end (in this,
case source host computer-to-final destination host
computer) techniques. The inner level is
undecipherable to all nodes except the one to which
the message was addressed (i.e. a separate key for
each pair of source and destination nodes conforming to
end-to-end encryption). Furthermore, a distinct and
different key is used to encrypt each message. The
outer level of encryption is link-to-link and uses
another key (which is unique for each channel and is
changed periodically) known to all physically connected
pairs of nodes which will contain, along with oth-r
information, the message destination. The safeguards
and protocols associated with proper message handling
are discussed In Chapter III.
Miscellaneous Issues . All issues pertaining to key
management (i.e. generation, distribution, and control),
which were assumed trusted, were beyond the scope of
this thesis. Remote key generation and distribution was
assumed available through trusted components. Also







and any other network. Therefore, eecurity of the
communication links Into the net from areas outside of
the building was assumed adequate. Access was in
accordance to the principles delineated by Kent and
reiterated by Ames. All three factors presented by
Downey for access control (which he defines as
clearance/classification, compartmental izat ion , and
need-to-know) were considered (SCH 73: IV-25-26). But
all these safeguards were not within the scope of this
thesis .
Summary
The security of the network will be established
on four key points. First and foremost, because without
it no security is possible, physical security will be
assumed. Then, all equipment used will be sheathed ac
required to protect against electromagnetic emanations.
Next, all transmissions will be source host computer-to-
final destination computer encrypted with message unique
keys as well as encapsulated within link-to-link
encryption which uses different keys for each channel
which are periodically changed. Finally, Kent's and








implemented on trusted systems.
The next chapter presents a detailed discussion
of the model snd how it was designed bearing in mind the
security constraints elaborated on in this chapter.
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This is a siodel of a local host-to-host computer
network which will be used to support distributed
processing and will concurrently support two different
levels of security classifications. Security
requirements will be considered at each step.
Additional requirements which the design should meet are
that the resulting model portray a network: 1) that is
maintainable, 2) that is fault tolerant, 3) whose
arrival and service rates can be varied, and 4) whose
traffic, the composition of which can alfo be varied,
can be limited to database transfers (which will be at
least 50 percent of the traffic) and "bursty"
interactive work primarily associated with distributed
processing. "Bursty" traffic is defined as messages of
less than 16334 bits. (It was determined that up to 50
-- but not more than 80 -- percent of the bursty traffic
would consist of a single screenful of data, this was
calculated to be less than 16K bits (HOE 83). The
database transfers are messages averaging 100,000 bits.
Database transfers will range between 100,000 and
26
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900,000 bits. As specified by ESC/AD, the network will
consist of seven nodes; three of the nodes will be
communication nodes providing connectivity to different
external long haul networks and four of the nodes will
be application nodes.
This chapter discusses how and why this
particular model was developed. It addresses itself
to decisions concerning the topology, the network
control, and the protocols. At each step, all
pertinant information, especially relevant security
considerations, and the options available are presented
along with the decisions made. It concludes with a
summary of the model.
Topology .
When developing a local network, one of the
first decisions involves the choice of backbone
topology. (This thesis does not include a discus-
sion of the local access topological design since
the research was directed to a host-to-host network.
The connection of the hosts, terminals, and peripherals












scope of this thesis. It is assumed that the nodal
hosts are connected to a peripheral local area network
or that the peripherals are directly connected to their
nodal host.) This decision is affected by such issues
as topological simplicity, ease of impleraentat ion
,
message transmission control, fault tolerance and
reliability characteristics, and the work the network is
expected to perform. In this particular case, the issue
of security considerations could be and were relegated to
the protocols, but they permeated the selection process
of topology, too.
There are three basic topologies applicable to
the backbone of a local network to choose from: the
.tar, the ring, and the web (CLA 61: 19-20). These
topologies are shown in Figure 1II-1. It should be
noted that the same topologies are often known under
different names. These aliases are presented in Table






















Figure III- 1 . Topologies: a) Star b) Ring c) Web
Star Network . The star network is a simple
structure. Unlike an uncontrolled topology, the
star eliminates the need for each node receiving a
message to make a routing decision to forward the
information by centralizing all message decisions in
one node (BAS 1: 366; CLA 81: 19-20; HAB 80: 964-
963; PEN 79: 166; STA 80: 63).








an excellent way to maintain security over all
traffic; it provides potential availability problems
if, for example, the central node fails (CLA 81:
21). A standby redundant control node configuration
could overcome this problem. But in any case, the
central node could become a bottleneck for traffic (HAB
80: 965) and it presents to the intruder a tempting
target at which to disrupt the entire system.
Ring and web topologies attempt to overcome the
star network's vulnerability by eliminating the central
node without completely sacrificing simplicity (CLA 81:
19-20; TRO 81: 7-11).
Ring Network . In ring topology, we find
messages going from node to node along undirectional
links until it arrives to its destination. Since
each node only has to recognize if the message
has arrived at its final destination or else
transmit it to the next node in the line, routing
decisions are kept to a minimum (W1L 80: 507).
But single loop rings suffer from poor fault
tolerance (TRO 81: 53; WOL 81: 149). Fortunately,








(PEN 79: 171-172, 228; TRO 81: 53. 73-74; WOL 81:
150).
Web Network . The web is characterized by
having all processing elements attached to a common
channel which is employed in a broadcast mode (CLA
81: 19-20; PEN 79: 166; TRO 81: 73-74). It is
superior in fault tolerance (DAS 81: 366); but
suffers from control problems in the areas of
synchronization, flow, and error control (HAB 80: 965).
Furthermore, for reasons of security, it is not
acceptable. Let us next examine the security appli-
cable issues.
In a secure network, a clear audit trail for each
transmission is required so that message arrivals can be
verified. Each message should only have on desti-
nation. With only one destination, security control
over the traffic is simplified and it is easier to
identify which messages are lost or inserted without
authorization (whether or not the cause is from mali-
cious acts or by spurious system errors). Therefore,
broadcast modes are not desirable. Because of this and
related security complications which arise from brocd-
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cast modes of operation, the web network is unacceptable.
Table III-l, derived from the works of Bass, Clark,
Habara, Penney, Stack, Tropper, and Wolf (BAS 81: 366;
CLA 81: 19-22; HAB 80: 964-965; PEN 79: 165-166; STA 80:
83; TRO 81: 7-72, 73- M 4; WOL 81: 148-150), summarizes
the attributes of the topologies discussed.
Table III-l
Comparison of



































































































Topology Decision . This analysis led to the
decision to opt for some form of a ring topology.
The advantages of ring networks speak for
themselves. King networks are relatively simple to
implement, relatively easy to modify (i.e. easy to
add/delete processing elements/nodes), have relatively
low start-up, modification, and maintenance costs (TRO
81: Pp. 8-9, 73), have a high degree of bandwidth
efficiency, and, with the advent of multiple-loop ring
networks, the fault tolerance problems can be overcome
while minimizing security problems (FAR 81: 135; PEN 79
172, 228; TRO 81: 53-55; WOL 81: 148-150, 158, 162).
After deciding which topology to use, the next
issue to be resolved is what network access control
scheme to apply. Controlling transmission over a
network is an important design issue (CLA 81: 19-20).
When can a user gain access to and control over the
transmission medium to enter data onto the backbone?
Network Access Control .
There are many different network access control
schemes that are applicable to a r ing .
t
opology .






discusses which was chosen to gain access onto the
network's transmission medium. The first strategy
to be examined is known as contention or random
access. This strategy is most often encountered in
bus topologies; but it has also been suggested for ring
topologies (CLA 81: 21; PEN 79: 166). The next three
are considered the "basic" ring access strategies (BUX
81: U65; CLA 81: 20; TRO 81:8).
Content ion . Thre are many contention
strategies (TRO 81: 77). In a contention scheme,
any node wishing to transmit does so. If two (or
more) nodes transmit simultaneously, a collision
occurs which will theoretically result in garbled or
lost transmissions. Therefore, one contention
control strategy (carrier sense multiple access —
CSMA) depends on the node that transmits detecting these
collisions and, when it does, waiting a random amount of
time before attempting retransmission. Unfortunately,
as the number of nodes increases, performance
deteriorates .
Also, contention schemes are better suited for







lead to a very low limit on the percentage of channel
capacity which can be utilized without causing the •
network to overload (saturate) with retransmission
traffic (BUX 81: 1470; CLA 81: 20-21; LIS 83: 30; STU 83
72-76; TAN 81b: 469; TItO 81: 76, 131-133). This
disadvantage of the contention scheme relates to the
complexity of the transmit/listen/retransrait if
collision detected control technique. Over a ring, the
propagation delay Is a limiting factor (SALW 83: 184,
190). How long should a node listen for a collision?
The unidirectional flow of messages from node to node
provides a natural ordering of all nodes that should
permit a much lower collision rate (CLA 81: 21). Also,
a contention scheme could be Implemented between each
pair of nodes to limit the propagation to one hop; but
then a message that Is not destined to an adjacent node
has to be retransmitted from every intermediate node
that it must cross. The difficulty of implementing any
contention scheme is not necessarily warranted if a more
feasible network access control scheme exists.
For this model, content-'on schemes display three










disadvantage of contention schemes Is that they are
meant to handle primarily "bursty" traffic and not
the data base transfer transmissions which dominate
this network. The next disadvantage is the complexity
of a contention scheme -- when a goal is to keep things
simple (Chapter I: Methodology, page 4), complexity is a
disadvantage. The third undesirable characteristic is
that security will be complicated by contention
strategies because of "lost" transmissions. Because of
these three disadvantages, contention schemes are not
deemed appropriate for this model.
Slots . The Pierce loop illustrates the slotted
ring access strategy (AGR 78: 674-675; BUX 61: 1466-
1467; PEN 79: 167-166; TKO 81: 8-9, 21-22; WOL 81:
14 9). In this strategy, a (one or more) fixed length
time slot, generated and synchronized by a designated
supervisory node, continuously circulates around the
ring. To inform a node whether or not a slot is in use
("full") or not in use ("empty"), a header is attached
to each slot. When a node wishes to transmit a message.
It must wait until an empty slot which it can fill
reaches it. At that time, the node alters the header to
37
/,.. \ ' / /

<»
reflect that It Is full and then uses the slot to
transmit Its message. The filled slot eventually makes
its way back to the node that filled it where It is
recognized, captured, and, if there is nothing to
transmit, marked empty. If there is more traffic to
transmit, the slot is reused immediately. It is becsure
of the ability to immediately reuse a slot that a node
with a heavy flow of traffic can "hog" a time slot
% 1 81: 70).
The major advantage of this control scheme is that,
with more than one slot, simultaneous transmission of
messages can occur (TRO 81: 8-9). This strategy was
deemed appropriate for this model despite the adverse
performance characteristics of "loop hogging".
Tokens . The token ring access rtrategy is
illustrated by the Newhall locp (ACH 78: 675; BUX
81: 1465-1466; PEN 79: 167-169, 176; TH0 81: 9, 11;
WOL 81: 148-149). Permission to transmit is passed
from node-to-node by a circulating token. Khen a
node receives the token, it may transmit one
message. If there is no message to t ansnit, or









next node in the loop. The major advantage of this
control scheme is that it allows the transmission of.
variable length messages (TRO 81: 8-9). Kummerle and
Reiser categorically state that token passing is
superior over a wider range of parameters than
contention schemes (KUM 82) which provides greater
potential long-term utilization. This strategy was
also deemed appropriate for this model.
Shift Register Insertion Technique . The shift
register insertion technique has been applied in the
distributed loop computer network (DLCK) and also by
the double distributed loop computer network (DDLCN)
.
According to Tropper, the shift register insertion
technique has the major advantage of the slot
(simultaneous transmission) as well as the variable
message length handling ability of token rings (TRO
81: 9). Penney mentions an additional advantage
which reflects additional reliability, the shift
register insertion technique has completely
distributed control of the transmission system (PEN
79: 170). But it does have the disadvantage of
additional delays as the message traverses nodes to
39
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its destination (TRO 81: 9). This strategy was also
deemed appropriate for this model.
Control Decision . To decide among the three
strategies deemed appropriate, an analysis that
compared them was required. Fortunately, there are
several sources each of which compares simulation
results of at least two of the strategies under
similar conditions. After reviewing these studies,
the shift register insertion technique was selected
as the most appropriate because it displayed
superior performance (PEN 79: 234-236; TRO 68-72).
Table III-2 summarizes the information drawn from the
various sources referenced in this section from the
standpoint of this model's requirements.
The next step was to analyze the protocols required
to meet the model's requirements.
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Comparison of Network Control Schemes
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Table III-2
Comparison of Network Control Schemes







Shift DLCN 1) Can 1) Additional
Register DDLCN transmit delays upon
Insertion variable message













Introduction to Protocols . Protocols are the
rules and conventions used to control network
functions. McQuillan and Cerf state that protocols
are logical abstractions of the physical process of
communication and they perform three vital tacks:
1) establish standard data elements, 2) establish
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paths (MCQ 7S: i).
Protocol design is the most critical aspect of the
model's development. It is here that the procedures
required to meet various design features are set. If
the procedures are incorrect, the network will not meet
its requirements.
A concensus on protocols has been developed; it is
found in the International Standardization
Organization's Reference Model for Open Systems
Interconnection (ISO OSI). The ISO OSI is presented in
an introductory fashion in Tanenbaum's "Network
Protocols" and in more detail in his book Cotnpu t er
Networks pages 10-21. From the ISO OSI, protocols have
been divided into seven layers. These layers and their
interrelationship is illustrated by Figure III-2. (For





















LayerLayer 5 Session Layer ---• 5
t Host-Host *
4 4
Layer 4 * Transport Layer Layer A
f Host-Host 4
4 4
Layer 3 ^— «. _ Network Host-IMP, * Layer 3
IMP-IMP, IMP-Host i
4
LayerLayer 2 *--_ Data-Link Host-IMP, 2
t IMP-IMP, IMP-Host +
4 4
Layer 1 »- - — -» Physical Host-IMP *
IMP-IMP, IMP-Host
Layer 1
[IMP - Interface Message Processor ]
Figure 111-2. The Seven-Layer ISO Reference Model.
Adapted from Tanenbaum's Computer Networks
(TAN 61a: 11, 16).
The protocols and protocol related decisions
that this thesis addresses are those that fall within
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&The transmission medium is discussed first. Then
the switching method. This is followed by the flow
.
control protocol along with the priority scheme which it
supports and the manner in which the transmission
frequencies are divided to make the priority scheme work
while maintaining two security levels. A discussion of
the error handling protocols then follows. Finally, a
discussion of the security protocols is presented.
The issue transmission medium to be selected is
presented here because it impacts upon the switching
method for message control and that in turn will affect
the transport protocol. (The protocols for the
physical, link control, and network and application
levels are not within the scope of this thesis. It is
assumed that the various standards which have been
developed for the lower three levels are followed. The
only point concerning this model is that of link level
encryption. It is assumed that appropriate equipment is
available to perform this task automatically and that
thi6 task is handled adequately.)
Switching methods are those techniques that affect
how the various users share the transmission medium.
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&The choices considered are circuit, message, and packet
switching (MCQ 78: 12). Each of these methods exhib-its
different properties which affect transmission
efficiencies. Circuit switching establishes an end-to-
end dedicated path before any data can be transmitted.
Message switching does not establish this circuit in
advance; instead the network makes Its transmission
decision at each node for the next hop. Packet
switching, which is best suited for interactive traffic
(TAN 81A: 116), acquires and releases the node-to-node
link as required. Table III-3 presents a comparison








































©Flow controls ensure proper functioning of the
communication channels with respect to message
transmission and reception. The main goal of f2ow
control is to avoid overloading a node (CLA 81: 29;
MCQ 78: 24; TAN 81b: 477). Also included in this
area is the traffic monitor which enforces flow
controls and which 1) supervises queues and the
algorithms that permit the entry/exit of messages, 2)
inserts dummy traffic that disrupts traffic analysis
by an intruder, 3) checks for lost or unauthorized
messages, and 4) monitors the loop for transmission
link breaks/faults.
An error/fault detection/correction protocol is
necessary due to the sensitive nature of the
information to be transmitted by the SL!I and by the
time sensitivy of the same. Detection and
retransmission was the obvious solution for two reasons.
First, there is no need to implement a costly error
correction process when the transmission medium, fiber
optics, supports very low error rates making the
probability of retransmissions due to bit errors very






Is best se-v-d \*f requesting retransmissions as required
Instead of at'.enpt in*, corrections.
The use si cyclic redundancy code (CRC) checksums
was the best means of detection over simpler parity
checking mechanisms that would be Inappropriate for
traffic that must always be correctly interpreted.
Furthermore CRC is capable of detecting a greater number
of errored bits (MCQ 78: 23). The parity checking is to
be implemented at the data link layer. Other parts of
the error function are required to handle link breaks
(which is handled in the network layer) and message
deletions and insertions (which are handled in the
transport level ) .
Internetworking is a major concern in this SLN
since three of its nodes (designated as communications
or "C" nodes) serve as gateways to external long haul
communications networks. As gateways, these "C" nodes
perform three functions:
1) network access protocol
translat ion/conversion
2) packet size matching
3) speed matching and synchronization
The most complicated function, that of protocol






Defense (DoD) decided to approach the Internetworking
Issue by declaring a set of Internetworking protocols
standards for the DoD community's host-to-host data
communications networks (DOD 82). The Internet
Protocol (IP) developed by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) on the ARPANET Is the
DoD internet standard. Interoperability was further
improved by the DoD declaring the Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP), to be built above IP, as another
standard for its host-to-host data communications
networks (DOD 82). The Air Force followed suit b>
declaring the same standards for all of its networks
(USAF 82; USAF 83)
.
For complete DoD compatibility, other protocol
sets to handle terminal (TELNET) and bulk file
transfer (FTP) applications are required. (The TELNET
and FTP protocols are built above TCP/IP.)
Eventually, DoD standards will be established for
these functions, too. Dr. Stillman (Technical Advisor,
USAF/SIT) strongly supports this approach; she feels
that TCP/IP standard protocol sets (and those protocols









meet the requirements of at least 95 percent of the
DoD's users (ST1 83).
Finally* access/security controls are those that
perform She necessary and proper checking of a job
request* These checks include authentication of the
user, verification that the user is authorized to use
each requested resource, and a complete mediation
check which ensures that the user is indeed on all
the pertinent access rosters for all the resources
requested and that the desired resources can be used
in the requested combination. But the only access
control protocols which will be examined and
considered pertinent to the model are checks to see
that the job is requesting a node which it can access
and verification of the legality of the priority
requested. Other security controls are assumed
properly enforced at the node of origin and re-
verifled at the node of destination.
Transmission Medium . There are two choices of
transmission medium. It could either be coaxial cable
or fiber optics. In the first chapter, the security













III--, a comparison of both mediums is presented. Fiber
optics are the best choice of transmission medium for
this SLN. Fiber optics are strongly recommended as the
transmission medium for this network because of its
superior electromagnetic emanation, error rate, tapping,
and Isolation characteristics. It was assumed that this













One way to more efficiently utilize a
transmission medium is to apply a multiplexing
technology. Multiplexing is a method by which more
than one channel of communication are combined into





1) Relative cost outlook
a) currently inexpensive Yes No
b) potentially inexpensive Yes Yes
2) Small diameter/weight No Yes










7) Supports Integrated services Yes Yes
8) Supports encryption Yes Yes
9) Relatively immune to noise Ye Yes
10) No crosstalk No Yes
11) Radio Frequency Interference Yes No
12) Electromagnetic Interference Yes No
13) Electrical isolation problems Yes No
14) Very low error rates No Yes
15) Tapping more difficult No Yes




Frequency division allocates a particular
section of bandwidth to each channel all of the "time
(MCQ 78: 10). With this scheme, potentially only a
fraction of the traffic will be intercepted if a tap
with incomplete frequency coverage does occur. This
limits the traffic that an eavesdropper can listen to
and adds a degree of protection against
unsophisticated intruders. The increased level of
sophistication required for such a comprehensive
full-coverage tap can serve as a deterrent to some
would be intruders. Further complications can be
added to the unsophisticated intruder by changing the
frequency assignments at random intervals. For this
thesis, the medium will be frequency divided in such a
way that each of the message channels will -, .>ort at
least a six megabit per second transfer rate. This
is because the size of the data base transfers which
the SLN must support. Figure III-3 illustrates how a
transmission medium that supports a 60 MBPS
transmission rate could be divided to support two
security classifications and three message
priorities .
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Bandwith channel assignments
Channel A: Flov Control Messages
Channel B: Security Level 1, Routine
Channel C: Security Level 1, Overnight
Channel D: Security Level 1, Immediate
Channel £: Unused
Channel F: . Security Level 2, Routine
Channel G: Security Level 2, Overnight
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ions (page 58 )
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Figure III-3. Model's Frequency Division
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Switching Method . The size of the messages on
this network will range from just a few bits (bursty
traffic) to 900,000 bits for the data base transfers. To
avoid retransmission of large data base transfers
because of errors and due to the fact that most of the
traffic will be data based transfers, each job request
will be limited to a fixed-size transfer block which
will consist of a hundred thousand bits for data and
2,400 bits of overhead (100K bits). Because of the size
of the data base transfers and as a way to divide these
transfers into frames or blocks which will make these
long data base transfers more manageable without hogging
the transmission lines when a higher priority message
must get through, packet switching was chosen. The block
size selected equals the size of the average data base
transfer (expected to be 100,000 bits) plus the overhead
bits for a header and trailer. It should be noted that
packet switching will support real time applications as
well as data storage, partial error control, fast
speed/code conversion, delayed delivery and multiple
message addressing (MCQ 76: 12). It is because of this
functional flexibility that packet switching was chosen
"W.V
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for the model. The queues in the SLN must be large
enough to hold the largest number of blocks that can
make up one message.
When a message 1b longer than the set block
size, it is divided into more than one block. These
blocks are labeled to maintain proper sequencing
when they are reasserbled . They are then transmitted in
order to the next node. Each block is considered and
handled as if it were an integral and complete message.
But at the final destination node the blocks are
reunited by the transport level protocol to form the
original message.
Flow Control . Traffic flow must be controlled
to maintain a coherent pattern of transmission which
will permit the proper monitoring of traffic in this
SLN and to eliminate loss of messages due to
insufficient available buffer space (TAN 81b: 4 7 7-
478). There are several conventions that must be
established to implement this control. Also, these
conventions will help create a clear audit trail for
messages. Some of the conventions are discussed in












The first convention in this area is that of
message acknowledgements. Uhen a message is
acknowledged, the sending node can delete it from
its buffer space. If it is not acknowledged after
some preset delay time, timeout occurs and it is
retransmitted. After a predefined number of
retransmissions, the problem of message loss due to
a potential security breach arises. Control is, in
that case, passed over to the security protocols
which are covered liter in this chapter in the
sections on error control and security protocols.
Flow control also prevents one IMP from
flooding another. Therefore, to avoid loss of
messages due to Insufficient buffer space, a
convention of message credits is established which
explicitly permit transmission from one node to
another by informing the transmitting node what the
receiver's available buffer space is and allowing
transmission only when that space is sufficiently-
large. This may cause some transmission delay due











node's buffer space is sufficiently large. But this
was considered a necessary cost to maintain proper
message audits for security purposes. It seems
feasible to add the capability of flushing the
receiving node's buffer space with some flow control
message or with some control information in the
header of a message to that node in the case of high
priority messages, but this was not included in this
model. It should be noted that implementing this
buffer flushing capability could result in
unacceptable message loss.
A priority scheme is discussed in these sections
on protocols because it affects message handling.
Priority Scheme . There will be three non-
preemptive priority classes within each of the
security classifications. These classes are, from
highest to lowest priority, immediate, routine, and
overnight. A round robin technique will be used to
address the queue of each of the classifications.
A job request with immediate priority will have
first call on the networks resources on a first-come








class. No request from the lower priority classi-
fications can be upgraded to this classification.
Routine jobs vill be routed as soon as possible
with a FIFO gueue discipline. They are subject to
delays only when an immediate job is present. Jobs
may not be routine if the data base transfer required
is larger than one half the maximum message size.
(The request may be routine, but the response may be




Overnight jobs have the lowest priority.
Messages of this class are released only when jobs
of the other classifications are not available for
transmission. Only a very small percentage of all
the jobs are expected to be classed as overnight.
From the information provided by Mr. Hoelscher
(the point of contact for this thesis at HQ ESC), it
is expected that immediate jobs will occur even more
infrequently than overnight jobs since only a crisis or
an emergency will warrant this classification. Routine







Jobs will be overnight and will consist of only large
data base transfers; immediate jobs will be negligible
in number.
Figures III-4 through III-6 illustrate the
network's connectivity and the allowable node
resource requests that may originate at a given
node. In those figures , the alphabetic character
"C" refers to a communication node which only
generates job requests and receives answers to these
requests. The character "A" refers to an
application node which responds to job requests and
which may generate requests of its own. There are
three" connunicat ion nodes and four application nodes
in this SLN.
Error Control . Dealing with transmission errors is
important. Without protocols to handle errors, accurate
communication is not possible (KEN 83; KCQ 78; PEN 79;
STO 80; TAN 81a; TAN 81b). The reliability of these
communications can be greatly improved if there is a
high probability that few if any errors go undetected.
The protocol primarily responsible with error control




data link level. It has been already mentioned that a
transmission medium with a very low error rate ls-
desireable (Table 111-3). To further improve upon the
reliability of the communications an error detection
mechanism is then necessary.
As Tannenbaum explains, errors can be handled in
two ways (TAN 81a: 126). One strategy is to include
enough information to the message that allows the
receiver to deduce if an error has occurred and have the
message transmitted. Another strategy would be to add
enough Information to not only deduce that an error has
occurred, but to also correct it. The second strategy
is not very efficient if the transmission medium
supports very low error rates. Since the selected
transmission medium is fiber optics (which supports very
low error rates), the first strategy was selected (MCQ
78: 23; TAN 81a: 129).
The means of detecting the error can be as
simple as a parity check. But greater reliability
can be achieved by a cyclic redundancy code (CRC)
(PEN 79: 227). Therefore, it was assumed that each













trailer which provides enough bits of information to
implement a CRC scheme at each node. Furthermore,
due to the need for error free communication, the
CRC can be supplemented with a simple scheme that
regards each transmitted block as a rectangular
matrix of n by m bits. In this scheme, a separate
parity bit is computed for each column and is
affixed to tne matrix as an additional row which is
then transmitted as part of the trailer. In either
case, the data link protocol is charged with ensuring
reliable link-to-link communications.
(A discussion of either the polynomial that would
be employed for the CRC scheme or how to perform the
parity scheme is not within the scope of this thesis.
But a good general discussion of both techniques can be
found in Tanenbaum's text.)
Also within this area is the question of what
should be done if after several transmissions an
error free communication is not achieved. First,
the fault protocol at the transmitting node's network
layer (which is waiting fov an acknowledgement) is called







functional. If the determination Is a link fault, then
transmission is attempted on the alternate loop.' If
that also is not possible, the node so informs all
linked nodes and each node's table of available paths is
updated to reflect that no traffic can reach a
particular node or set of nodes. Also, if the receiving
node continues to receive a message that it has
acknowledged and which is still in its buffer, it also
calls the fault protocol to determine if there is a link
fault. The availability of two loops Increases the
probability that the nodes will still be linked after
one or more link faults. If a message Is deemed
undel iverable because the addressee cannot be reached,
the sender is informed and the message is flushed. (A
simulation of the fault-tolerance and redundancy aspects
of the SLN is not covered within this thesis. Wolf's
work addresses this problem in some detail for a
distributed double-loop network.)
If the problem is not a fault, it could be a
more subtle problem and both the security and
maintenance people at the SLN would be notified and

















the maintenance people can attempt to check the
problem out or the message is successfully
transmitted.
Security Protocols . The main security
protocols this thesis is concerned with deal with
encryption. The link-to-link encryption (implemented in
the data link layer) is assumed automatic and reliably
implemented. It is the source host-to-final destination
host encryption (implemented in the transport or
presentation layer) which provides the necessary
additional level of security required for the SLIJ.
The key used for the link-to-link encryption
between each pair of nodes protects the entire packet of
Information transmitted. Each packet's data Is also
encrypted with a code used only between a given source
and destination node for that security classification
and for that particular session. This dual encryption
technique forces the intruder to know both codes to get
to the information when it is most vulnerable, during
transmission. A further enhancement is that these codes
change periodically, with each session. In this manner,











he has all the codes and not all sessions. The remote
keying mechanism and the session level protocols. that
this would entail are not within the scope of this
thesis. But the overhead in resources and processing
time that security forces upon the network is expected
to be relatively high.
The fact that nodes communicate with others at
particular security levels allows for a design that
denies the installation of equipment capable of decoding
the traffic that a node is not allowed to access.
Thus, each node will have, in addition to the link-to-
link encryption/decryption machines for each channel, a
pair of encryption/decryption devices for messages that
it receives/transmits (one set for each security level).
(It may be possible that one remote keying device serve
all security levels.) In this model, the maximum number
of nodes any single node can communicate with is three and
all them fall under the same security classification.
Only node C3 communicates in two different security















Figures 1II-5 and X1X-6.)
Another aspect of security la the need to deny
the potential enemy reliable traffic analysis.
Therefore, there Is a need to have fake or dummy
messages in the transmission stream. The security
protocols will also control the transmission flow of
dummy messages.
Dummy Message Control . Whenever there is no
message to transmit from a security classification
(remember the round robin aspect of these
transmissions) and there U available buffer space
at the next node, a single block with randomly
generated bits is transmitted to the next node and
then flushed from the queue Immediately. The
channel is selected by analyzing a random number
which will control what percentage of the time a
message should flow in that channel when there is no
traffic. The header information for this dummy
message will tell the receiving node that this is a
trash message so that it is flushed from the buffer
immediately. No acknowledgement is required. It is

















down the immediate priority channels since these
will normally have the least traffic. The fact that
there normally is no traffic on these channels would
indicare reaction to some critical problem. Therefore,
sending dummy traffic on these channels would deny that
certainty to a monitoring enemy.
However, the price of denying traffic monitoring
with the use of dummy traffic should be analyzed
further. The impact of this traffic could significantly
affect throughput of real traffic. Such delays may be
considered unacceptable while the security risk of
allowing potential traffic monitoring could be considered
justified by the responsible authorities.
Summary of the Model .
The next three figures present the dual ring
topology of the model and the required traffic
connectivity. Figures III-5 and III-6 are specially
important because they define the logical link by
allowable security classes among the nodes. There are
three facts that stand out from those two figures. One
is that node C2 does not generate any classification 1
traffic and that node CI does not generate any
67
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classification 2 traffic. The second is that node Al is
the only recipient of classification 1 traffic and that
node Al cannot process any classification 2 traffic.
The third and final fact is that only node C3
communicates in two different security levels and only
with one "A" node in each case. Then Figure I1I-7
presents a summary of how traffic is processed within
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if flow control packet then
if acknowledgement then erase acknowledged
packet from buffer and send credit
packet to neighbor nodes
else if credit then
update credits for node affected
go to I
if retransmission request then
get requested packet and go to J
verify checksum and parity correct
if detected error and
retransmission counter > a max count
then notify nodes of problem
set notification flag
reset retransmission counter to
go to 1
if detected error then
request retransmission
add 1 to retransmission counter
go to 1
if no error then




if CRC and parity checks
and security checked
and final destination is this node
and message complete then
sequence the blocks
decode the entire message
go to 3
else if no error and security checked
and for this node then
strip trailer information
restore in buffer
go to I {* msg not complete *}
else go to 4 {not for this node *}













(3) : send on to computer resources (via DMA)
overwrite buffer space with O's and l's of
the just transferred message
send credit messages
go to I
(4) : recode Header
(5) : send to proper queue
within security classification
(a) : divide message into blocks
encode message by block
(b) : compute CRC and parity checks
attach Trailer to block
encode Header
(c) : send to proper queue
within security classification
(I) : choose next packet to transmit
using credit information for that node
(Round Robin of classification queues,
FIFO within queue.)
if no message to transmit in either queue
then poll queues
until interrupted by a message arrival
or until a message can be sent
(J) : transmit chosen message on correct channel
if not retransmission then
decrease credits of node message sent to
go to I
A head-in required to do band selection is
available at each node due to the different
channels to be selected.










From the preceding four figures, it can be seen
that the designed SLN has a dual loop ring topology with
a store and forward scheme. As transmission medium, the
SLN uses fiber optics for point-to-point communications.
The frequency division multiplex technique is applied to
the medium to provide multiple channels to implement
multiple security levels. Packet switching with a block
length equal to header and trailer length plus the
average data base transfer message length, 100,000 bits,
is used to handlr variable length messages. Block
length is fixed at 100K bits. This, along with the
creation of dummy traffic, will hamper traffic analysis.
Dummy traffic will provide an additional degree of
security. Acknowledgement and credit conventions have
been adopted to avoid message losses due to insufficient
buffer capacity at the receiving node. There is. one
queue for each classification. Each queue is long
enough to hold the maximum number of blocks which can
make up one message. Each queue is ordered according to
one of three priority classes. When the entire message
arrives at its final destination, it is decoded. Error
correction will not be implemented. Instead, correct
*a 73
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data reception will be provided with an error detection
scheme. This error detection scheme will be implemented
using both CRC and parity techniques. This combination
of techniques will yield an extremely low probability of
missing any errors. It will also help in the detection
of message stream modification when an intruder is not
sophisticated enough to properly modify the CRC and
parity check fields. Additional memory space is
available at each node to provide a work area for
decoding the message headers without altering the
message in the buffer. But when the entire message is
being decoded, the decyphered text is held in the
message buffer until it is transfered to the host
computer. This transfer is performed, for the model's
purposes, instantaneously using direct memory access.
Upon completion of the transfer, the area where the
decoded message resides in the buffer is overwritten
three times with l's and then three times with O's to
help provide an additional measure of security.
Security is maintained during transmission
through a two level encryption process which combines





to-final destination host encryption. Actions
relating to the session level security aspects are all
Ignored because they do not fall within the scope of
this thesis. How a packet is handled at a node is
illustrated in Figure II1-7 at the start of this
chapter's summary.
With the design of this model complete, the next
step was to evaluate it. Jackson's Theorem u:s
applied to the model to enable an analysis of the
network's operation in the environment defined above.
Chapter IV discusses this analysis and an attempted
simulation of the model.
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In this chapter, the analysis of the SLN by
applying Jackson's Theorem is presented. Then, the
attempted simulation of the network is presented and
analyzed. Finally, some conclusions are drawn about the
model
.
Analysis with Jackson's Theorem .
Simplification of the Model . Jackson's Theorem can
only be applied if the model meets specific constraints.
A goal of the simplification was to meet those
constraints so that analysis using Jackson's was
possible. Furthermore, the simplification process had
to maintain the main elements of the designed network's
traffic pattern to lend credence to the results of the
analysis. Therefore, to streamline the model, several
steps were taken to highlight the important traffic
without seriously affecting the results of any analysis.
The first step resulted in eliminating from
consideration the generation of external traffic at all
of the "A" nodes. This was done simply because it is






direct result of requests/traffic received over the "C"
nodes (HOE 83).
The next step eliminated the generation of dummy
traffic. Then, all consideration of traffic which
would result from an explicit acknowledgement function
was eliminated. Also, the priority scheme was ignored.
These three steps were taken to simplify the traffic
load analysis. It was deemed more important to get a
gross idea of the model's behavior before expending
resources in an effort that could be terminated early
on through a simple test.
The fifth and final step was to assume that the
packets arrive in o'der and are fed directly to the
host when they arrive at their final destination.
This simplifies the processing at each node and can
be implemented through protocols. Furthermore,
because a very low error rate is expected, all
transmissions are assumed error free; therefore, no
packages will have to be retransmitted.
The result of the five steps was a simpler
version of the network model which did not alter the
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grossly affect the Analysis. But* the performance
results expected from &n analysis of a siaplif led -model
by applying Jackson's Theorem will most likely be
better than those resulting from the application of the
same theorem to the complete model. The next major step
vas to see if the model would fit the Jacksonlan
constraints.
Applying Jackson's Theorem . An analysis of the
network was necessary to see how the model was expected
to beh'ave. As stated in the preceding section, the
network model was simplified to permit Jacksonlan
analysis. After determining the general expected
behavior of the network under expected constraints, if
the results were deemed favorable, follow-on studies
could then be used to attain greater confidence in the
network's design. If the results of the Initial
analysis were found to preclude the success of the
design, then redirection was possible without having
wasted efforts in a detailed and microscopic analysis.
Figure IV-1 is an accurate illustration of the
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- Class 1 Queue
CO - Communication Node
A# Application Node
D# « Departure Rate from System
Gti External Arrival Rate to System
[2] - Class 2 Queue
Figure IV-1. The Network.
Due to the traffic that the network supports, each
node is actually composed of four components (refer to
Figure IV-2). One component processes classification 1
traffic that is addressed to that node. Another
component handles classification 1 traffic that is
enroute to another node. A third component processes
classification 2 traffic for that node. The fourth
component handles classification 2 traffic that is
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Figure 1V-2. Nodal Components.
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The reason for this breakdown is that traffic is
not uniformly distributed by classification nor is it.
uniformly distributed by destination. Furthermore,
traffic that is not destined for a given node is
processed differently than traffic that is destined for
that node. This latter traffic has a longer service
time. Even though the processing time at the IMP for
all traffic is roughly equivalent, additional time is
required for "this node" traffic due to the response
which is assumed generated for all traffic from the host
computer connected to that node. This difference in
service rate affects performance for "this node" traffic.
Therefore, the network is actually composed of seven
nodes each with four servers.
For traffic that is not addressed to a node, a
fixed, deterministic, processing l me was used to
reflect the constant time required for packet handling.
For traffic that is addressed to a node, each server uses
an exponentially distributed processing time to which a
fixed, deterministic time is added. But, to apply
Jackson's Theorem, some assumptions had to be made.
Jackson's Theorem stated that the joint distribu-
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tion for all nodes factored into the product of each of
the marginal distributions is given as the solution t-o
the M/M/m system (KLE 75: 150). This theorem applies to
open networks of queues with Poisson arrivals, FCFS
queues, exponential service times, and no saturated
queues (KLE 75: 149, SAU 81: 80-81). Furthermore,
thanks to Burke's Theorem, a network of multiple-server-
nodes connected in a feedforward fashion still preserve
the node-by-node decomposition that makes Jackson's
Theorem so useful (KLE 75: 149). For this evaluation
all of the conditions were met or could be assumed as
met for analytical purposes when the service times for
all traffic was idealized to exponential service rates.
The deterministic service rate was added to the mean of
the expected service rate to yield a new exponential
service rate. This shifted the mean service rate but
did not totally ignore their deterministic component.
Having met the necessary conditions for Jackson's
Theorem, Table IV-1 was developed presenting the arrival
rates in terms of the external arrival rates to the





Mean Arrival Rates for the Simulation
Using Jackson's Theorem.
Node Latada
(in terns of external arrival rates)
&
Al[l]t .5 CI + G2 t .5 G3
Al[l]n
Al[2]t
Al[2]n .5 (Gl + G3)
A2[l]t
A2[l]n .5 Gl + G2 + .5 G3
A2[2]t 1/6 (Gl + G3)
A2[2]n 1/3 (Gl + G3)
A3[l]t
A3[ l]n .5 Gl + G2 + .5 G3
A3[2]t 1/6 (Gl + G3)
A3[2]n 1/3 (Gl + G3)
A4[l]t
A4( l]n .5 Gl + G2 + .5 G3
A4[2]t 1/6 (Gl + G3)
A4[2]n 1/3 (Gl + G3)
Cl[ l]t .5 Gl
Cl[ 1 Jn .5 Gl + G2 + .5 G3
Cl[2]t .5 Gl
Cl[2]n .5 (Gl + G2)
C2[l]t G2
C2[l]n .5 Gl + G2 + .5 G3
C2[2]t
C2[2]n .5 (Gl + G3)
C3[l]t .5 G3
C3[ l]n .5 Gl + G2 + .5 G3
C3[2]t .5 G3
C3[2)n .5 (Gl + G3)
C# Communication Node Att » Application Node
[1] - Class 1 traffic [2] - Class 2 traffic
n traffic not for this node
t traffic for this node
Gil » External Arrival Rate to System




Re cults . It was, of course, known that these
results were idealistic since each node really was a
•ingle-server end processing times could be deter-
ainistic depending on the type of traffic being pro-
cessed. But the careful selection of the parameters
helped provide confidence in the results of the analysis
The computations made for Table IV-2 were based on
one packet per message, external arrival rate of 0.0001
messages per millisecond (i.e., Gl « G2 = G3 » 0.0001),
a service rate of 0.001 millisecond per packet for "not-
this-node", and a service rate of 0.006 milliseconds
per message for "this node" traffic. This arrival rate
is considerably faster than the expected and forseeable
average traffic load for the network of 100,000 bits of
raw data per second over one "C" node and 50,000 bits of
raw data per second for each of the other two "C" nodes
(HOE 83). Thi6 faster rate was chosen to provide
greater confidence In the results of an analysis
performed on an idealistic representation of the model.
The service rates are those expected with the equipment




Table IV-2. Performance Parameters
Computed Using Jackson's Theorem









































































C# Communication Node A* Application Node
[1J - Class 1 traffic [2] - Class 2 traffic
n • traffic not for this node





Froa the computational results. It can be inferred
that the designed fullblown SLN model should provide
adequate performance and process effectively the bulk
data traffic that characterizes the expected traffic
load. As Table IV-2 shows, the system is very capable
of handling traffic at one packet per message with an
arrival rate of 0.0001 messages (packets) per
millisecond and a service rate of one message (packet)
per millisecond. Even if each message was made up of
more than one packet* the utilization rate (arrival
rate divided by service rate) would still be less than
one. As stated earlier, the chosen arrival rate used
is an extreme case load that is ten to twenty times
greater than what could be considered within the realm
of possibility. Yet, at every point, the utilization
rate is considerably less than one. Therefore, the
network should be stable and capable of handling a
heavier traffic load.
The Simulation and Throughput Performance .
The simulation should show how throughput is
affected by different mixes. Factors that
Influence throughput are the error rate and the
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resulting retransmission, maximum message size, block
size, medium speed, arrival rates, and service rates at
the nodes. Arrival and service rates and message
length are the only variables addressed by the
thesis; the other variables are left for further
study.
Guidance provided by the thesis sponsors Halted
the range of some of these variables (HOE 82; HOE 83).
All traffic entering the system would be uniformly
distributed over the three communication nodes. (The
distribution of the classification of this traffic was
previously addressed in Figures III-5 and III-6.) Short
bursty transmissions and data base transfers would be
the only type of traffic. The data base transfers
would range from 50 to 80 percent of all messages.
Data base transfer traffic is expected to average about
100,000 bits in length with a range from 100,000 to
900,000 bits. Three priority classes were generated
for the model. At least 50 percent of the traffic
would be routine and traffic for the highest priority




To focus on the network, it was assumed for this
thesis that each individual host would have its own
priority scheme and would handle the messages as it
deemed appropriate. But handling the priority scheme
was beyond the scope of the analysis performed. Table
IV-3 shows the areas actually addressed by the
simulation.
tvcv
Table IV-3. Variables Used in the
Analysis of the Network's Throughput Performance.
1) Arrival rate
2) Service rate
3) Message length (range: 1 to 10 packets)
Some areas are left unexamined by the simulation.
Such areas as the impact of link faults, buffer size, and
error rates on the SLN's throughput, are left for
follow-on projects. This simulation concentrates on
the three areas identified in the preceding table.
But how are these areas studied?
Examining Throughput Performance . The
simulation program implementing the model had to have
flexible entries for the features listed in Table IV-3
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wto be examined. Runs were performed changing only one
of those three parameters between executions. To'help
in the evaluation* the maximum number of packets held in
each node's buffer for each run was to be kept, as veil
as the number of messages and packets processed at each
node. This would permit analysis on how variations
affected results.
Since the processing of the SLN's traffic
consumes time and the traffic could not be generated
in real time, the program had to simulate the passing
of time. Events are therefore created end processed
to simulate this passage of time. The program
implements an event driven simulation.
The Design Process . Software engineering
techniques were applied. First* the requirements
had to be explicitly defined and the functions that
were to be performed defined and refined until a
structure chart of modules is fully developed. Most
of the Initial work was spent on the generation of
what is Illustrated in Figure III-7. It was critical
to know or decide how messages were tc be processed
at each node so that the network analysis could be
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determined. General traffic flow requirements were
defined In Figures III-4, III-5, and III-6.
After developing the functions that vere to be
performed at each node (which resulted in Figure XII-
7), a chart presenting the functions to be performed
was drawn. Initially, the functions to be Implemented
included retransmissions and flow control. Then, the
number and diversity of these functions was limited by
the problems that arose with the language being used
to implement the simulation and by the mathematical
tools available to perform the analysis. After the
decision was made to restrict and simplify the model,
the next step was to see how the functions necessary
to simulate the SLN could be grouped or developed.
This resulted in Figure IV-3. The technique of
stepwise refinement was used to get the simulation
down to a level that could lead to code. From the
very start, a data dictionary (Appendix C) was
maintained and every effort was made to use names that
were meanginful. The names of constants, variables,
procedures, and functions were made self-explanatory
whenever possible within the constraints placed on their
90
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length by the coapiler and by the programmer *s
additional constraint of avoiding multiple lines Tor
simple data manipulations . Furthermore, the programmer
avoided nesting of "if" statements to ease debugging.
This latter constraint could be changed later if code
optimization were desireable.
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Figure IV-3. Functions Performed
by the Simulation Program.
It was obvious at the start that there would be
variable parameters in each run. A parameter
initialization module had to be the first module which
had to Interact with the user who would input
parameters. Of special importance was the start time
for statistics collection since the simulation would
£-:, 92

>^f^^^^ i i^ j ^i ijpipij «^ i yywi^
<£
have to run some undetermined amount of time to reach
steady state prior to data collection. This tlme'vas
to be arbitrarily set and hopefully a reasonable delay
tine would become apparent through trial-end-error.
But before any Initialisation module was designed, the
first step tsken was to translate che traffic load
into an event generating algorithm that represented
it.
The event generation function was a straight
forward Implementation thanks to the detailed
Information made available on the expected traffic
load (refer to Chapter 111, especially the sections
entitled: Overview, Switching Method, Priority Scheme,
and Summary of the Model). The only hitch in the
entire algorithm development process was the lack of
random number generators in the chosen language, PASCAL.
Books by Hillier and Sauer (HIL 73; SAU 81) eventually
helped by providing formulas for exponential
distributions. But the cleanest solution was the one
finally implemented, to use CBAS1C 11 (Compiler Systems,
Inc., version 2.0, July 1981) to generate, initially, a
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nuebcrs which could then be accessed by the simulation
program whenever it required a uniformly distributed
number. (After much trial-and-error , the best cycling
that was achieved for a uniformly distributed pseudo-
random number generator was every 574 times, this was
deemed, after consultation with the thesis advisor,
borderline acceptable. Reading from a file of uniformly
distributed random numbers was easier to follow for
purposes of programming and debugging.)
Next, after developing the event generating algorithm,
handling of the created event record via a linked-list
queue was tackled. The queue manipulation function
was much more difficult. Translating Figures III-4,
III-5, and 111-6 and Figures IV-1 and 1V-2 into code
was just the beginning. Event insertions and
deletions, walking the queue, moving events about in
the queue to simulate the flow of a packet around the
network to its destination and the Integration of
calls to modules to generate new events as well as the
insertion of code to trap required data for follow-on
analysis was not trivial. Fortunately, the decision
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simplified the iapleaentat ion . The final program design
is reflected by the structure chart in Appendix B .'
The Differences . As Figure IV-1 illustrates,
several SLN functions discussed in Chapter III were
not Implemented in the simulation. There are six
Important differences which resulted from the
model's simplification. The rationale for this
simplification is discussed in detail at the beginning
of this chapter. Briefly, the simplifications were
required to permit analytical validation of the model
with Jackson's Theorem.
The first difference is the lack of external
traffic generation at the "A" nodes. The next
difference is the lack of dummy traffic generation.
The third difference is the lack of an explicit
acknowledgement function. The fourth difference is
that packets are assumed to arrive in order and to be
fed directly to the host when they arrive at their
final destination. Next, the priority scheme is
ignored. Finally, the sixth major difference is that
all transmissions are assumed error free.
The Problems. As has already been remarked, the
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simulation was an additional attempt to further
validate the network model that was designed.
Unfortunately, the simulation was never completed.
Several problems hindered the successful execution of
the simulation. The most critical problem was the
language chosen for the simulation.
Language and Machine Decisions . The SLN model
developed over the preceding two chapters was a severely
constrained by the chosen simulation environment. The
simulation was to be performed on a microcomputer to see
what could be accomplished on a small system. As far as
could be determined, no network simulation had yet been
performed on a microcomputer. Performing the simulation
on a microcomputer would present constraints en the
simulated model due to available memory and computing
power. The choice of language would also affect the
implementation due to routines available and ease of
use. A machine and a language had to be chosen. The
process is presented below.
The machine desired was a microcomputer with a
proven processor chip. Other desired characteristics
were a large main memory and as much easily accessible
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secondary storage as possible. Finally, the machine had
to be available for use.
Because of availability, an Intertec Data Systems
"Superbrain" 280A microcomputer with dual 5.25 inch
single-sided soft-sectored floppy disk drives (each with
162K useable storage capacity) with 66K RAM was u*=ed.
When that machine shorted out, it was replaced with a
microcomputer of the same make, but with double-sided
floppy disk drives-. The upgrade In disk storage
capacity was a definite asset during the development of
the thesis because of the additional 332X of secondary
storage .
Because of software availability, the language
choices were limited to some form of Basic, C, or
Pascal. Due to the unstructured nature, non-overlay
features, and language construct limitations of the
Basic softwares available, Basic was not chosen. Both C
and Pascal did not suffer these handicaps.
#
They are
structured languages and they both support overlays.
After talks with some members of the faculty and uslnp. a
timely article in ACM Computing Surveys by Alan R.
Feuer, Pascal was chosen since It was structured, Its
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dynamic storage for link lists was deemed highly
appropriate for event-driven simulations, and the-
available compiler was apparently well-documented and
supports overlays (critical in a RAM constrained
environment), and this researcher was familiar with
the language through courses recently completed.
Once Pascal and the machine were chosen, the
next phase was to see how code the model and evaluate
the network's performance .
The Languaf •» . The Pascal language supports
both overlays and recursive calls has a good
diagnostic package to aid in debugging, is structured,
and the author had some programming experience In the
language. But the software did not provide any number
generator routines and does not provide the programmer
with a simple and direct capability for direct bit
manipulation. In retrospect, for this restricted
memory environment, the bit manipulating capability of
C was a more Important characteristic which should
have led to it being chosen instead. Besides, C also
provided several number generator routines. But the
restrictive memory in itself was not the problem since
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overlays could in part offset it by not having the
entire program in sain memory.
Unfortunately, the most blatant problem during
the development of this thesis was the language
chosen. This problem manifested itself in primarily
two ways. In the first place, overlays were never
possible. In second place, the debugging package was
not fully useable.
Without overlays, the number of functions that
could be simulated was reduced. This caused
considerable simplification of the model which in
itself was not as discomfit t ing as the reason why
overlays were not performed. After working with
Pascal for a while, it became apparent that the
documentation package was not as good as advertised
and therefore, expected.
The other major problem was that to use the
debugger, the program size was drastically limited.
That may have been solved with overlays, but as
mentioned above, the documentation was not that easily
or well understood. In fact, no one was found to
provide any aid in this area. Thus, overlays were not
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performed and the debugger was not available to help
during the debugging phase. But even if the debugger
had been available for use, its usefulness was
severely handicapped by the fact that it could not
handle real numbers. This severe handicap was not
discovered until the software development was well
into the coding phase. All in all, it may be best to
have C as the language for any follow-up work on a
microcomputer
.
The last related problem was that when the
simulation program was finally compiled clean, it did
not execute as expected. This was never resolved
prior to the thesis effort being terminated. But it was
the development of a means to handle random numbers that
caused the single most frustrating period during the
generation of this thesis.
The Random Kumber Generator . The development
of the uniform random generator was more difficult
than expected. Several sources presented good
examples for mini and other large computers, but
none presented one for a microcomputer.
Finally, the theory presented by Sauer and
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Rlllier was used to program a number generator. But
when it was tested, cycling occurred so quickly that.
its value was questionable, though considered
ac-cepteble. Finally, after some study and trial-and-
error, the solution adopted was to generate a uniform
number file using C-BAS1C II which was then read as
necessary by the Pascal program. This was quickly
tested and proved a clean implementation prior to its




Application of Jackson's Theorem validated the
designed network. Even though the results of this
analysis are idealistic, the careful simplification
and streamlining of the model and the judicious
selection of arrival and service rates provide a high
degree of confidence in the design's ability to meet
its traffic goals
.
As for the simulation program (Appendix A), it would
be Interesting to see the model validated in this manner
Definitely, it would behoove whomever desired this SLN
to have it simulated with as realistic a set of




actually developing the network were made. A SLN is
not an inexpensive system since heavy software costs
are involved to develop protocols and interfaces which
are not in existance today.
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Chapter V; Conclusions and Recommendations
Overviev .
As shown in the preceding chapter, the simplified
version of the designed model should be able to handle
the projected work load. Based on that analysis, it is
expected that the more complex model (summarized in
the last section of Chapter 111) would also meet the
work load requirements. In any case, the model was
designed to: 1) effectively process bulk data traffic,
2) provide a high level of security, and 3) permit
multiple concurrent transmissions of different
classifications. In this last chapter, areas for
further study are presented and some conclusions are
drawn from the experience of completing this thesis.
Areas for Further Study .
There are at least five areas left for further
study. The five areas discussed below were not fully
developed within the scope of this thesis, but they all
deserve additional research and examination.
In the first place, an attempt to generalize the
network model for applicationc more interactive/bursty
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$In nature could result in different design elements.
Thic researcher believes that the major differences
between the design of this SLN and one with more bursty
traffic would be in the area of topology (a web might be
more appropriate) and network access control (possibly
contention instead of shift register Insertion).
But, within the framework of this design and ESC's
specific constraints, the addition of dummy traffic, of
new arrivals from the "A" nodes, of flow control
traffic, of error/reliability traffic (retransmissions),
and of priority traffic to a simulation for the purpose
of examining throughput would be of major interest. Of
course, this would entail successfully developing the
simulation attempted for this thesis work. In any case,
the traffic that is potentially the most damaging to
throughput is the dummy load. It could cause
unacceptable delays which would require the re-
examination by higher authorities of its need for
security .
A third area would be research into the
interoperability and interface issues of a SLN and other






TCP/IP and the projected national level long haul
communications networks like the Defense Data Network
would be within the scope of such work.
Another area that deserves more study is that of
fault tolerance and fault limitation/isolation in both
physical (hardware) design and in the design of
protocols. But probably the most intriguing area would
be in the fifth area, the expansion of the security
aspects of this thesis.
The encryption of this model revolves about the
secure/ trusted generation and distribution of keys and
\£p their management. This area has been addressed by
many without, to this researcher's knowledge as of
August 1983, an accepted way of doing so. (Accepted by
this country's national level security agencies.) Any
follow-on work in this area could bring great dividends
to this nation's security.
Conclusions .
The interplay of topology, network access,
switching method, and flow and error control protocols
was challenging, extremely enlightening, and definitely
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interesting. Tho addition of security constraints
does cloud the issue of performance, but flexible'
designs with inherently good performance
character it ice sees to t*e best suited for security,
too. The design process is definitely influenced by
security issues, especially those which deal with the
need to limit the electromagnetic emanations of the
hardware and the need to guard against traffic analysis.
But, the key to achieving security seems to exist
primarily within the realm of software access controls
implemented in the network's protocol structure (even if
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ROGRAM SLN_SIM (INPUT, OUTPUT):
C0NFIG_C0NTR0L - '04 JULY 1983: VERSION 2G'
IMPLEMENTATION OP A
SECURE LOCAL AREA NETWORK (A SLN)
THIS SIMULATION MODEL WAS DEVEL0PFD TO MEET
THESIS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE GCS PROGRAM AT
THE AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DEPT (AFIT/EN)
THIS PROGRAM WAS USED TO VERIFY THE RESULTS
DERIVED USING JACKSON'S THEOREM IN THE THESIS
AUTHOR: RICARDO G. CUADRCS, CAPT USAF
ADVISOR: WALTER D. SEWARD, MAJOR USAF, PhD
PROGRAM DATES: 12 FEB 1982 - 24 JULY 1993
ENVIRONMENT:
INTERTEC DATA SYSTEMS SUPERBRA1N QD
CP/M 2.2 OPERATING SYSTEM
DIGITAL RESEARCH PASCAL MT+ VER 5.5
GENERAL DESCRIPTION:
GENERATE AN EVENT QUEUE SORTED BY TIME
AND INCLUDING NODE AND CLASSIFICATION DATA
PROCESS THE EVENT QUEUE TO SIMULATE
TRAFFIC FLOW
COLLECT TRAFFIC DATA
TRAFFIC FLOW: COUNTER-CLOCKWISE )
v <- 3-2-1 -< ~ )
-> 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 -> >
NODES 1, 2, 3 ARE COMMUNICATION NODES }
LIST OF PROCEDURES AND FUNCTIONS ## >
PROCEDURE INITIAL; 01 >
< PURPOSE: TO INITIALIZE VARIABLES, }
{ ASSIGN FILES, AND TO CONTROL FIRST >





















































< PROCEDURE GENEVENT (SRC NODE: INTEGER): 02 }
PURPOSE: GIVEN THE NODE, CREATE THE >
NEXT EVENT >
)
{ PROCEDURE COMMNODE; 03
PURPOSE: CONTROLS COMM NODE INFO FOR GENEVENT
PROCEDURE COMMNODE; 03
PURPOSE: GIVEN TH TIME, INSERTS AN L/ENT IN
THE PROPER PLACE OF THE EVENT QUEUE
PROCEDURE DELEVENT: 05
PURPOSE: DELETES AN EVENT FROM THE HEAD OF
THE EVENT QUEUE
< PROCEDURE MOVEVENT; 06
PURPOSE: MOVES EVENTS ABOUT THE MODELED NET;
HAS ALGORITHMS FOR COUNTERCLOCKWISE
TRAFFIC FLOW; AND SERVES AS TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER
{ PROCEDURE QWALK; 07
PURPOSE: TO HELP COLLECT QUEUE INFO FOR RUN
{ PROCEDURE WRAPUP; 08
PURPOSE: RUN TERMINATION CONTROL FOR A NORMAL
CLOSE OF FILES AFTER RUN
< PROCEDURE UFILREAD; 09
PURPOSE: TO READ FROM THE UNIFORM NUMBER FILE
w«w*ION SRC : REAL; 10
PURPOSE: TO PROVIDE ARRIVAL TIME INFORMATION
< FUNCTION SVC : REAL; 11
PURPOSE: TO PROVIDE SERVICE TIME INFORMATION
A-2






















































CONST { GLOBAL CONSTANTS >
















0.001; { IN MSG PER MILLISEC FOR
0.003; { ARRIVAL AND SERVICE RATES
'C { ALL PKTS FOR THIS KSG RCVD
•P* < NOT COMPLETE
0.500; <LEN# :
0.750; { GIVES PROBABILITY KSG
0.875; {IS <- #PKTS LONG
0.9375; { (0 REPRESENTS 10 PKTS)
0.96875; < THESE VALUES CHOSEN
0.984375; < TO MEET REQUIREMENT
0.9921875; { THAT MSG BE LEN 1 50Z
0.99609375; { OF THE TIME.
0.9990234375;
1.0000000000;














REAL; {EVENT TIME; SORT KEY )
INTEGER; {CURRENT POS: 10-30, 1-7)
INTEGER; {INBOUND DEST NODE 4-7)
INTEGER; {OUTBOUND NODAL SINK 1-3)
INTEGER; {CLASS: 1 OR 2 )
CHAR; {COMPLETE (C) OR PARTIAL (P))


























































































< COUNTERS: INDEX CORRESPONDS TO 'RELATIVE' NODE >
CLASS 1 CNT : REAL;
CLASS 2 CNT : REAL;
C STRTSTP : ARRAY [1. .7] OF REAL;
HI VALUES : ARRAY II. .7] OF REAL;
MAX-IN BUFFER ! ARRAY 11. .7] OF REAL;
MSGS : ARRAY [1. .7] OF REAL;
PCKTS : ARRAY 11. .7] OF REAL;
P STRTSTP ! : ARRAY 11. .7] OF REAL;
SMSGS : ARRAY [1. .7] OF REAL;
SPCKTS ! ARRAY [1. .7] OF REAL;
{ MISC VARIABLES >
ERROR LEVEL : 1LNTEGER;
EVENT Q_LEN : ][NTEGER;
10 STATUS : ]LNTEGER;
LCNT : 3[NTEGER;
MAX PCKTS : 3[NTEGER;
MODULE NAME : iLRRAY [1. .12] OF CHAR;
PCKT NUM : 3[NTEGER;
PCKTS IN_HSG: 3[NTEGER;
RDT : /IRRAY (1. .20] OF CHAR;
SRC NODE : 3[NTEGER;
TEMP VAL : 3[NTEGER;






{ * * * PROCEDURES AND FUNCTIONS
PROCEDURE INITIAL;
VAR LCNT : INTEGER;
BEGIN
MODULE_NAME :- 'INITIAL ';
WRITELN (' ENTER REMARKS FOR THIS RUN - 20 CHAP');
LCNT :- 1;









WRITELN ('ENTER MAX NUM OF PCKTS PER MSG - INT'):
READLN (MAX_PCKTS)
;
IF MAX_PCKTS > 10 THEN MAX PCKTS :- 10;
WRITELN ('ENTER TIME TO STOP RUN - REAL - SEC);
READLN (STOP TIME);
WRITELN ('ENTER DATA COLLECT START TIME




Stmt Nest Source Statement
188 2 FOR LCNT :« 1 TO 7 DO BEGIN {'0' OUT COUNTERS}
189 3 PCKTS [LCNT] : 0.0;
190 3 HI_VALUES [LCNT] .- 0.0;
191 3 MSGS [LCNT] !!- 0.0;
192 3 MAX IN BUFFER [LCNT] : - 0.0;
193 3 SMSGS[LCNT] :- 0.0;
194 3 SPCKT3[LCNT] .- 0.0;
195 3 C STRTSTP[LCNT] :- 0.0;
196 3 PJSTRTSTPJLCNT] !- 0.0
197 3 END;
198 2 EVENT Q_LEN :« 0;
199 2 ERROR__LEVEL :- 0; {STATUS OK; '9' MARKS PROBLEM }
200 2 CLASS1 CNT :- 0.0;
201 2 CLASS2 CNT :- 0.0;
202 2 { INITIALIZE QUEUE AND QUEUE POINTERS >
203 2 NEW(HDPTR);
204 2 WITH HDPTR* DO BEGIN
205 3 E TIME :- 0.0;
206 3 ATJJODE :- 0;
207 3 TO NODE :- 0;
208 3 EX NODE :- 0;
209 3 CLASS :- 0;
210 3 C OR P :- '0';
211 3 E NEXT :» NIL
212 3 END;
^•7 213 2 ATPTR :- HDPTR;
214 2 END PTR :- HDPTR;
215 2 TEMP PTR :- HDPTR;
216 2 WRK E TIME :- 0.0;
217 2 WRK AT NODE :- 0;
218 2 WRKJTO NODE :- 0;
219 2 WRK EX NODE :- 0;
220 2 WRK CLASS :- 0;
221 2 WRK C OR P :- '0';
222 2 WRK E NEXT :- NIL;
223 2 ASSIGN(DFILE,'A:RUNDATA.OUT');
224 2 REWRITE (DFILE);
225 2 ASSIGN(UFILE,'A:UNIFORM.DAT');
226 2 RESET (UFILE);
227 2 WRITELN (DFILE, CONFIG CONTROL,' REMARKS « ' ,RDT)
;










WRITELN (DFILE,' ARRIVAL ' ,ARRIVAL_RATE,
;SERVICE ' ,SERVlCE_RATE)
;
WRITELN (DFILE,' MAX PKTS '.MAX PCKTS);
WRITELN (DFILE, 'INITIAL .ERROR LEVEL);
< GENERATE 1ST 3 ARRIVALS - 1/C NODE }
WRITELN (' GENERATING THE FIRST THREE EVENTS ');
















FOR LCHT :- 1 TO 3 DO BEGIN
GENEVENT(LCNT)
END; { NOW SET TIME TO 1ST ARRIVAL )
TIKE NOW :- HDPTR~.E TIKE
END;
PROCEDURE GENEVENT(VAR SRC_KODE: INTEGER);
VAR GLCNT: INTEGER;
BEGIN < ALGO IMPLEMENTS PIG. II-5 & 6 OP THESIS }
KODULE_NAKE :- 'GENEVENT *;
WRITELN('IN '»KODULE_NAHE,'FOR SRC_NODE- ',
SRC_NODE)
;
246 2 WRITELN(DFILE,MODULE_NAKE,ERROR_LEVEL,' ',
SRCJIODE)
247 2 TEMP_VAL :- SRCJIODE;
248 2 IF SRC_NODE < 10 THEN SRC_NODE :- SRCJIODE * 10
249 2 ELSE ERRORJLEVEL :- 9;
250 2 IF ERROR_LEVEL <> 9
251 2 THEN BEGIN
252 3 UFILREAD;
253 3 WRK AT_NODE :- SRC_NODE;
254 3 IF SRC NODE < 40 THEN WRK EX_NODE :- TEKP_VAL;
255 3 IF SRC_N0DE < 40 THEN COMHNODE
256 3 ELSE { SRC NODE > 30 >
^ 257 3 WRK KJTIME :- TIKE NOW + SVC;*
{ RESPONSE AT APPL )
258 3 UFILREAD;
259 3 IF U-VALUE <- LEN9 THEN PCKTS IN KSG:-9
260 3 IF U-VALUE <- LEN8 THEN PCKTS IN KSG:-8
261 3 IF U-VALUE <- LEN7 THEN PCKTS IN KSG:-7
262 3 IF U-VALUE <- LEN6 THEN PCKTS IN KSG:-6
263 3 IF U-VALUE <- LENS THEN PCKTS IN HSG:-5
264 3 IF U-VALUE <- LEN4 THEN PCKTS IN KSG:-4
265 3 IF U-VALUE <- LEN3 THEN PCKTS IN MSG:-3
266 3 IF U-VALUE <- LEN2 THEN PCKTS IN KSG:-2
267 3 IF U-VALUE <- LEN1 THEN PCKTS IN KSG:-1
268 3 ELSE PCKTS_IN_HSG :- 10;
269 3 IF PCKTS IN_MSG > KAX PCKTS THEN
270 3 PCKTS INJMSG :- KAX PCKTS;
271 3 WRK_C 0R_P :- PARTIAL;
272 3 FOR GLCNT :- 1 TO PCKTS IN KSG DO BEGIN
273 4 IF GLCNT - PCKTS_IN-KSG
THEN WRK_C_OR P :- COMPLETE;
274 4 INSRT(WRK_E TIKE)
275 4 END < FOR )
276 4 END; { IP ERROR_LEEL <> 9 )
277 2 WRITELINCBYE ' ,KODULE_NAKE)
;
278 2 SRC_N0DE :« TEKP_VL
{ SETS SRC_NODE TO ORIGINAL CALLING PARAK >


















































































































MODULE NAME :- 'COMMNODE ';
WRITELN(DFILE,MODULE NAME, ERROR LEVEL,' ',
SRC_N0DE)
;
WRKJMttNE :- TIME HOW + SRC;
WRK CLASS :- 1;
IF TSRC NODE <> 20) AND (UPVALUE < 0.50)
THEN WRKjCLASS :- 2;
IF WRK_CLASS - 1 THEN BEGIN
HRK_T0_N0DE :- 4;
CLASS 1 CNT :- CLASS ljCNT +1.0
END;
IF WRK CLASS - 2
THEN BEGIN
CLASS 2 CNT !
WRK_TO_NODE
END;
IF ((WRK CLASS - 2) AND (U_VALUE < 0.66666667))
THEN WRK_TO_NODE :- 6;
"
IF ((WRK_CLASS - 2) AND (UPVALUE < 0.33333333))
THEN WRK_T0_N0DE :- 5
END; < COMM NODE >
PROCEDURE INSRT (VAR TTIME; REAL);
BEGIN { LINK-LIST IN ASC ORDER BY EJTIME )
MODULE_NAME :- 'INSRT ';
WRITELH(D?ILE,MODULE_NAME,ERROR_LEVEL, ' ' , TTIME)
;
WRITELN(MODULE_NAME, ERRORJLEVEL, ' ' , TTIME)
;
EVENT_Q_LEN :- EVENT_Q LEN + 1;
WITH HDPTR~ DO BEGIN
{ KEEP TRACK OF MAX PCKTS IN BUFFER }
IF ((AT NODE > 0) AND (AT_NODE < 10)) THEN
BEGIN
HI_VALUES [AT_N0DE] :- HI_VALUES [AT NODE] +1.0;
IF HI_VALUES [AT_NODE] < HAX_IN_BUFFER [AT_NODE]
THEN
MAX IN_3UFFER[AT_N0DE] :- HI_VALUES [AT_N0DE]
END
END; { WITH >
IF (RDPTR~.E TIME - 0.0) THEN
BEGIN < LIST EMPTY >



















































































































IP TTIME < HDPTR". EJTIME THEN
BEGIN < INSERT AT HEAD OF LIST >
NEW (TEMP PTR);






















HDPTR :• TEMP PTR
END
ELSE BEGIN < INSERT AFTER START OF THE LIST >
ATPTR :- HDPTR;
WHILE TTIME >- ATPTR". E_NEXT".E_TIME DO
ATPTR :- ATPTR*. EJJEXT; { END WHILE >
NEW(TEMPJPTR);
















IF TTIME >- END_PTR".E_TIME
THEN END_PTR :- TEMP PTR;





(SHOULD ONLY BE DELETING FROM THE HEAD OF THE LIST)
MODULE_NAME :- 'DELEVENT ';
WRITELN (DFILE ,MODULE_NAME , ERROR_LEVEL )
;
IF ( (HDPTR".AT_NODE > 0) AND (HDPTR~.AT NODE < 10))
THEN HI_VALUES [HDPTR*.AT_N0DE] - 1.0;






























EVENT QJLEN :- EVENT q_LEN - 1
END; <DELEVENT}
PROCEDURE MOVEVENT;
VAR LCNT : INTEGER;
BEGIN
{ CHECK FOR ARRIVAL AT COMM TO GENERATE NEW ONE )








10 : LCNT :- 1;
20 : LCNT :- 2;
30 : LCNT :- 3
END;
WRITELN (MODULE_NAME , ERROR_LEVEL , ' ' , LCNT )
;
IF LCNT <> THEN GENEVENT(LCNT)
;
IF ((TIMSJJOW < STOPJTIME) AND
(TIME_NOW >- STARTJTIME))
THEN BEGIN
TEMP VAL :- HDPTR".AT_NODE;
IF TEMP VAL >- 10
THEN BEGIN
TEMP_VAL :- (TEMP_VAL DIV 10);
PCKTS [TEM_VAL] :- PCKTS [TEM_VAL] +1.0;
IF (HDPTR". C_OR_P - COMPLETE) THEN
MSGS [TEM_VALJ :- MSGS [TEM_VAL] + 1.0
END
END;
WITH HDPTR" DO BEGIN
{ MOVE TO NEXT NODE >
IF ((ATJNODE - 7) OR (AT_NODE - 70))
THEN AT_NODE :- 1
ELSE
IF ((AT_NODE > 0) AND (AT_NODE < 7 ))
THEN AT_NODE :- AT_NODE + 1;
IF (ATJNODE > 9) AND (AT_NODE < 70 ))
THEN AT_NODE :- ((AT_NODE + 10) DIV 10)



































•/>'' Stat Nest Source Statement
422 2 IP HDPTR**.AT_KODE <> EDPTR~.TO_NODE
423 2 THEN < THAT ENTRY AND CREATE A NEW ONE }
424 2 BEGIN










427 3 WRK_TO NODE
428 3 WRK_EX_KODE
429 3 WRK CLASS
430 3 WRK_CjOB_P
431 3 INSRT(WRX_E_TIME)
432 3 END < <> )
"
433 3 ELSE
434 2 IP HDPTR~.AT_NODE - HDPTTT.TO NODE
435 2 THEN { ARRIVED TO APPLICATION SINK )
436 2 BEGIN












444 4 GENEVENT(WRK_AT NODE)
445 4 END < COMPLETE )
446 4 END; { - APPLICATION NODE ARRIVAL )
447 2
448 2 IP ((TIME_NOW < STOPJTIME) AND
(TIME_NOW >- STARTJTIME))
44 ft 2 THEN BEGIN
450 3 IP ((HDPTR~.AT_NODE - HDPTR~.EX_NODE) OR
451 3 (HDPTR~.AT NODE - HDPTR~.TO_NODE)
)
452 3 THEN BEGIN
453 4 SPCKTS[RDPTR~.AT_NODE] :-
SPCKTSIHDPTR".AT~NODE] +1.0;
454 4 IF HDPTR~.C_OR_P - COMPLETE THEN





459 2 IF ((HDPTR~.AT_NODE - HDPTR~.EX NODE) OR
460 2 ((HDPTR~.AT NODE - HDPTR~.TO_NODE) OR
461 2 ((HDPTR~.AT_NODE <> HDPTTT .TO_NODE)
)
463 2 THEN DELEVENT
463 2 ELSE ERROR_LEVEL :- 9;
464 2
465 2 TIME_NOW :- HDPTR~.E TIME































VAR LCNT : INTEGER;
BEGIN
MODULE NAME :- 'QWALK ';
WRITELN (MODULEJtAME , ERROR




WHILE ATPTR~.K_NEXT <> NIL DO
BEGIN
LCNT :- LCNT + 1;
WITH ATPTR* DO;
BEGIN
IF (<AT_NODE > ) AND (AT NODE < 10)) THEN
IF (CJ0R_P - COM LETE) THEN
C_STRTSTP[AT NODE] :-
C"~STRTFSTP [AT NODE] +1.0
484 4 ELSE P STRTPSTP[AT_NODE) :«
P_STRTPSTP [AT NODE] +1.0
END { WITH >
END; { WHILE <> NIL >
WRITELN (DFILE, 'LCNT « ',LCNT,' Q_LEN - ',
EVENT_Q_LEN)
;
FOR LCNT :- 1 TO 7 DO BEGIN
HI_VALUES [LCNT] : - P-STRTSTP [LCNT]
MAX_IN_3UFFER[LCNT] : HI VALUES [LCNT]
END < FOR )
END; ( QWALK >
PROCEDURE WRAPUP;
VAR LCNT : INTEGER;
BEGIN
{ WRITE OUT TO DFILE THE SIM DATA DESIRED }
QWALK;
ELAPS TM :- TIME_NOW - START TIME;
WRITELN (DFILE, 'ERROR_LEVEL - '.ERROR LEVEL);
WRITELN (DFILE, 'DATA COLLECTED FOR ',ELAPS_TM,
SEC; TIME NOW - ',TIME_N0W);
FOR LCNT :- 1 TO 7 DO BEGIN
WRITELN('IN WRAPUP AT NODE # ',LCNT);
WRITELN (DFILE, 'AT NODE # ',LCNT);
WRITELN (DFILE, 'STOP STATUS: MSGS - ',
C_STRTSTP[LCNT]);
506 3 WRITELN (DFILE,' PCKTS - ',
P_STRTSTP[LCNT]);
WRITELN(DFILE,'MSGS GENERATED - ',MSGS [LCNT]
;
WRITELN (DFILE, 'PCKTS GENERATED - ', PCKTS [LCNT]
;


























».*/.* Stmt Nest Source Statement
WRITELN (DFILE, 'EVENT QUEUE LEN AT STOP TIME
EVENT_Q_LEN);
CLOSE (UFILE,IO_STATUS);
IP IO_STATUS - 255
THEN WRITELN ('ERROR IN UPILE CLOSURE')
ELSE WRITELN( 'UPILE CLOSED');
CLOSE (DFILE, 10 STATUS);
IP IO_STATUS - 255
THEN WRITELNC ERROR IN DFILE CLOSURE')




MODULE_NAME :« 'UFILREAD ';




IF U_VALUE - EOFJJNIF THEN BEGIN
RESET (UFILE);
READ (UPILE ,U_VALUE)
END; < IF )
"
WRITELNC* * * * *EXITING ' ,MODULE_NAME)
;
WRITELN (DFILE ,MODULE_NAME , ERROR_LLVEL
,


















































FUNCTION SRC : REAL;
VAR INT_RESULT: REAL; { SRC/COMM NODE ARRIVALS )
BEGIN { RETS VALUE FROM EXPONENTIAL DIST. >
UFILREAD;
INT_RESULT :- -((ARRIVAL_RATE)*(LN(1.0 - UPVALUE)));
IP INT_RESULT <- 0.0 THEN BEGIN
WRITELN ('****ERR0R IN SOURCE ***');
ERROR_LEVEL :- 9
END
WRITELN (DFILE, 'SRC READ ' ,INT_RESULT, ' ' ,EI-.0R LEVEL)
END; { END OF SRC >
FUNCTION SVC : REAL;
VAR INT_RESULT: REAL; { SERVICE RATE W/SKEW-TIME)
BEGIN { RETS VALUE FROM EXPONENTIAL DIST. )
UFILREAD;
INT RESULT :- -((SERVICE RATE)*(LN( 1.0 - UPVALUE)));
IF INTJRESULT <- 0.0 THEN BEGIN
WRITELNC*** ERROR IN SERVICE ***');
ERROR_LEVEL :» 9
END
ELSE SVC :- INT_RESULT FIXED PROCESSJTIME;
WRITELN(DFILE,'SVC READ ' ,INT_RESULT, ' ' ,ERROR_LEVEL)
END; { END OF SVC >
A-12


















































WRITELNC ERROR LEVEL :- ',ERROR_LEVEL,
' AFTER INITIAL');
WRITELN(DFILE, 'ERROR LEVEL :- ',ERROR_LEVEL,
' AFTER INITIAL');
WRITELNC* ************** MAIN1');
IF ERROR_LEVEL - 9 THEN TIME NOW :- 9.60E+15;
WHILE (TIME NOW < START_TIME) DO
WHILE (TIME_NOW < HDPTR~.E_TIME) DO
BEGIN
MOVEVENT;
IF ERROR LEVEL 9 THEN TLME NOW :- 9.60E+15
END; ( TIME_NOW < HDFnT.E-TIME )
( END WHILE TIME_NOW < START_TIME )
WRITELNC IN MAIN AFTER SET-UP; ERROR LEVEL - '
,ERROR_LEVEL)
;
1 WRITELN(DFILE,'IN MAIN AFTER SET-UP;ERROR LEVEL - '
ERROR_LEVEL)
;
1 WRITELNC* ************** MAIN2');
1
1 IP TIME_NOW <> 9.60E+15 THEN BEGIN
2 QWALK;
"
2 WRITELN(DPILE, 'START TIME STATUS: ');
2 FOR LCNT :- 1 TO 7 DO BEGIN
3 WRITELN(DFILE,'AT NODE # ',LCNT);
3 WRITELN(DFILE,' MSGS: ' ,C-STRTSTP[LCNT]
,
' PCKTS: ',P_STRTSTP[LCNTJ)
END ( FOR LOOP )
END; ( TIME_NOW <> 9.60E+15 )
WRITELNC IN MAIN READY TO START UP '.ERROR LEVEL);




WHILE (TIME_NOW < STOPJTIME) DO
WHILE (TIME NOW < HDPTR~.E_TIME) DO MOVEVENT;
( END WHILE TIME_NOW < STOPJTIME )
WRAPUP;
WRITELNC DONE ')
END . ( END OF THE PROGRAM )
Normal End of Input Reached
A-13
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HODES 1, 2, 3 ARE COMMUNICATION NODES
HODES 4, 5, 6, 7 ARE APPLICATION NODES
PROCEDURES AND FUNCTIONS #.#
1. PROCEDURE INITIAL: 1.1
PURPOSE: TO INITIALIZE VARIABLES, ASSIGN
FILES, AND TO CONTROL 1ST 3 EVENTS
2. PROCEDURE GENEVENT(SRC NODE: INTEGER); 2.1
PURPOSE: GIVEN THE NODE, CREATE THE NEXT EVENT
3. PROCEDURE COMMNODE: 3.3
PURPOSE: CONTROLS COMM NODE INFO FOR GENEVENT
4. PROCEDURE INSRT((TIKE: REAL); 3.4
PURPOSE: GIVEN TH TIME, INSERTS AN EVENT IN
THE PROPER PLACE OF THE EVENT QUEUE
5. PROCEDURE DELEVENT: 5.5
PURPOSE: DELETES AN EVENT FROM THE HEAD OF
THE EVENT QUEUE
6. PROCEDURE MOVEVENT: 1.2
PURPOSE: MOVES EVENTS ABOUT THE MODELLED NET;
HAS ALGORITHMS FOR COUNTERCLOCKWISE
TRAFFIC FLOW; AND SERVES AS TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER
7. PROCEDURE QWALK: 2.2
PURPOSE: TO HELP COLLECT QUEUE INFO FOR RUN
8. PROCEDURE WRAPUP; 1.3
PURPOSE: RUN TERMINATION CONTROL FOR A NORMAL
CLOSE OF FILES AFTER RUN
9. PROCEDURE UFILREAD; 4.1
PURPOSE: TO READ FROM THE UNIFORM NUMBER FILE
10. FUNCTION SRC : REAL; 3.1
PURPOSE: TO PROVIDE ARRIVAL TIME INFORMATION
11. FUNCTION SVC : REAL; 3.2
PURPOSE: TO PROVIDE SERVICE TIME INFORMATION
CONSTANT
GLOBAL
ARRIVALJRATE- 0.0001; { IN MSG PER MILLISEC FOR )
COMPLETE « 'C { ALL PKTS FOR THIS MSG RCVD )
CONFIGJCONTROL - LITERAL ALTERED BY MANUALLY TO TRACK
PROGRAM VERSION
EOF_UNIF - 999.999; { EOF OF UNIFORMJDAT FILE )
FIXED PROCESS TIME - 0.015;
C-l

LEN1 - 0.500; <
LEN2 - 0.750; {
LEN3 - 0.875; <
LENA - 0.9375; <
LEN5 - 0.96875; {
LEN 6 - 0.984375; {




PARTIAL - 'P'; <
SERVICE RATE - 0.003; {
LEN# :
GIVES PROBABILITY MSG
IS <- 3PKTS LONG
(0 REPRESENTS 10 PKTS
THESE VALUES CHOSEN
TO MEET REQUIREMENT THAT
MSG BE LEN 1 50Z OF TIME.
NOT COMPLETE >
ARRIVAL AND SERVICE RATES )










{ EVENT TIKE; SORT KEY >
INTEGER; < CURRENT POSITION: 10-30, 1-7)
INTEGER; { INBOUND DESTINATION NODE 4-7)
INTEGER; < OUTBOUND NODAL SINK 1-3)
INTEGER; { CLASSIFICATION: 1 OR 2 >
CHAR; { COMPLETE (C) OR PARTIAL (P)>
EVENTPTR; < NEXT RECORD/EVENT >
<£>
VARIABLES
COUNTERS: INDEX CORRESONDS TO 'RELATIVE' NODE
CLASS 1_CNT : REAL; <NUM MESSAGES ENTERING THE >
CLASS 2 CNT : REAL; { NETWORK FOR A GIVEN CLASS)









ARRAY [1..7] OF REAL
ARRAY [1..7J OF REAL
ARRAY [1. .71 OF REAL
ARRAY [1..7] OF REAL
ARRAY [1..7] OF REAL
ARRAY [1..7] OF REAL
ARRAY II.. 7] OF REAL


























INTEGER; { - OK; 9 - ABORT RUN )
INTEGER; {TO DETERMINE MAX_IN_BUFFER)
INTEGER; { USED IN CLOSE CMD )
INTEGER; { GENERAL PURPOSE COUNTER )
INTEGER; { LIMITS MSG LEN )
ARRAY [1..12] OF CHAR; { DEBUG RMKS )
INTEGER; { USED IN MSG GENERATION )
INTEGER; { USED IN MSG GENERATION )
ARRAY [1..20J OF CHAR; { RUN REMARKS )
C-2
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INTEGER; < USED IK MSC GENERATION >
INTEGER; (GENERAL PURPOSE TEMP HOLD )
REAL; < RESULT OF READ FROM UFILE >
EVENTPTR;
EVENTPTR;
REAL; { ELAPSED TIME >
REAL; { START DATA COLLECTION )
REAL; < STOP DATA COLLECTION >
REAL; { CURRENT SIMULATION CLOCK TIME >
WORK ELEMENTS FOR MESSAGES
WRK_E_TIME : REAL;
WRK_AT NODE : INTEGER;




WRK C_OR_P : CHAR;
WRK E NEXT : EVENTPTR;
{ CURRENT POSITION: 10-30, 1-7)
{ INBOUND DESTINATION NODE 4-7)
{ OUTBOUND NODAL SINK 1-3)
{ CLASSIFICATION: 1 OR 2 )
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